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The importance of the private sector for economic development is 
undisputable. Private actors - whether we talk about firms or other 
organizations - are an essential part of the web that forms a well-
functioning society. 
However, the role of the private sector in development cooperation 
is more disputed, from proponents’ claim that supporting the growth 
and development of (formal) business is at the heart of what aid 
should do to antagonists’ view that aid could and should be used 
better than to increase profits for business. 
The present report is not about private sector development in 
partner countries per se. It studies the extent to which actors in the 
business sector can act as partners in development cooperation to help 
fulfil the objectives of aid.  In the report, Sara Johansson de Silva, Ari 
Kokko, and Hanna Norberg map out the extent of, and analyse the 
potential development gains from, the formation of partnerships 
between public and private actors in Swedish development 
cooperation. Such partnerships, referred to as Joint Development 
Initiatives (JDI), are expected to realize mutual gains. Potential gains 
for public actors include an increase in reach and improved efficiency 
in delivery; additional (private) financial resources and innovative 
capacity. Potential gains for private sector actors include the 
emergence of new firms and markets when prohibitive risk levels are 
lowered through public involvement; market access and higher 
turnover for existing firms; and more socially responsible business 
practices, increasing the sustainability of firms. 
How to proceed so as to ensure this win-win (with the public win 
being the main focus of the report) is essential. It is not obvious that 
the interest (or incentives) of private and public partners are aligned, 
there are more or less inherent conflicts between commercial 
objectives and objectives such as local ownership, harmonization, spill 
overs and improved market efficiency. 
The Joint Development Initiatives form a diverse and relatively 
new set of instruments. The inventory in the report includes 
innovative investment activities (e.g. challenge funds), collaboration 
with and support to sustainable business practices, and the leverage of 
private financing for development. JDIs constitute a collection of 
pilots rather than an established modality. Thus, there is no 
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comprehensive picture to be drawn on whether JDIs are effective 
forms of collaboration. It is however argued in the report that even 
though Swedish JDIs tend to be focused on low income countries, 
they are not likely to have more than a marginal direct effect on 
poorer population groups, and in some areas (e.g. institution building) 
they are not likely to be efficient instruments. JDIs should therefore 
be seen as a complement to more traditional forms of engagements. 
Thus, any larger reallocation of aid towards these forms of 
partnerships is not recommended by the authors. Still, there are good 
reasons for including the private sector as a partner in development 
cooperation. For example, private companies and entrepreneurs 
possess technical and managerial know-how, and collaborations 
between civil society organizations and firms are likely to strengthen 
sustainable business practices. Given the lack of comprehensive 
evidence of JDIs, a gradualist approach seems like a sensible 
recommendation. 
Also, the potential for this kind of partnerships seems to be higher 
in countries a bit up in the per capita income ladder, and some of these 
countries are no longer eligible for receiving aid. The recommendation 
to establish an informal development broker facility in order not to 
cut cooperation between partners just because aid is being cut is an 
interesting bridging mechanism. 
As shown in the report, a small share of Swedish aid is directed to 
JDIs. While acknowledging the difficulties in defining and identifying 
JDIs, the share is estimated to about two per cent of Sweden’s aid 
budget. Given the promise but also the risks with JDIs, decisions to 
change this share substantially should be preceded by further analysis 
and discussion. 
The authors’ work has been conducted in dialogue with a reference 
group chaired by Mr. Torgny Holmgren, member of the EBA. The 
analysis, views and recommendations expressed in the report are the 
sole responsibility of the authors. 
Stockholm, November 2015 
 
Lars Heikensten  
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Sammanfattning 
Ökade möjligheter för näringslivssamverkan i biståndet 
Sveriges Politik för Global Utveckling (PGU) har som mål att 
Sveriges bistånd ska bidra till en rättvis och hållbar utveckling i 
samarbetsländerna och på det globala planet. Syftet är att skapa 
förutsättningar för att människor, som lever i fattigdom och i 
förtryck, ska kunna förbättra sina levnadsvillkor. Dessa mål ligger väl i 
linje med dem som gäller för det internationella givarsamfundet i 
gemen (Swedish Government, 2014). 
Även om det råder en bred enighet om de övergripande målen för 
biståndet, finns det också en växande insikt om att givarsamfundet 
behöver hitta nya mekanismer och bredare partnerskap för att uppnå 
målen. Flödet av direktinvesteringar och transfereringar till u-länderna 
har ökat kraftigt sedan 1990-talet och når nu även låginkomstländer, 
med tydliga effekter på lokala ekonomier och levnadsförhållanden. De 
privata aktörerna bidrar inte uteslutande med utvecklingskapital, utan 
både civilsamhället och näringslivet har en ambition att delta i 
utvecklingsprocessen. Som ett resultat av detta har biståndet minskat i 
betydelse, både som finansieringskälla och som drivkraft för 
ekonomiska och sociala förändringar. Denna nya situation har lett till 
ett behov av nya former av partnerskap mellan privata och offentliga 
aktörer. I den här rapporten definierar vi sådana samarbeten mellan 
den privata och offentliga sektorn inom biståndet som “Joint 
Development Initiatives” (JDIs), dvs gemensamma utvecklings-
initiativ. 
Det finns stora potentiella vinster om privata företags finansiella 
resurser och deras kompetens och innovationskraft kan utnyttjas mera 
effektivt för att driva utvecklingen. Samtidigt finns det en risk i att 
dessa partnerskap kan kompliceras av att vinstintressen och 
utvecklingsmål blandas ihop. I synnerhet kan det uppstå 
motsättningar mellan rent kommersiella drivkrafter och flera av 
principerna för biståndseffektivitet: bred systemförändring, lokalt 
ägarskap och harmonisering av biståndsinsatserna, mer effektiva 
marknader, transparens, och avbindning av bistånd från kommersiella 
intressen. Givet bredden och mångfalden i de nya former av JDIs som 
utvecklats under senare år, finns det inte tillräckligt övergripande 
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utvärderingar som kan användas för att fastställa hur effektivt dessa 
samarbetsformer når sina (utvecklings)mål. 
Mot denna bakgrund syftar denna rapport till att bidra med (i) en 
kartläggning av de JDIs som för närvarande kan identifieras inom 
ramen för Sveriges biståndsprogram, (ii) en genomgång av huruvida 
dessa instrument är relevanta för Sveriges biståndsmål, samt (iii) en 
diskussion kring om, när och hur de olika risker vi identifierat kan 
dämpas för att säkra ett effektivt bistånd. De flesta nu existerande 
JDIs är dock relativt nya och förändras kontinuerligt, vilket medför att 
det ännu inte finns någon systematisk utvärdering av denna 
samarbetsform. I kombination med bristen på publicerad information 
om enskilda insatser innebär detta att rapporten inte göra anspråk på 
någon bedömning av de olika insatsernas effektivitet och verkan.   
Rapportens analys är baserad på följande grundvalar.  
a. Ett övergripande mål: Utveckling. Kommersiella intressen kan 
utgöra ett viktigt incitament för att engagera den privata 
sektorn i utvecklingsarbetet, men vi ser inte kommersiella 
intressen som ett mål i sig. Det följer att biståndsfinansering av 
JDIs kan motiveras i den utsträckning insatserna ökar 
utvecklingseffekter och bidrar till mervärde genom att 
underlätta investeringar som annars inte  hade ägt rum. 
Biståndet ska inte användas för att subventionera vare sig 
vinstdrivande företag eller företagsaktiviteter inom CSR-
området som skulle eller borde genomföras utan inblandning 
av offentliga biståndsmedel.  
b. Många möjligheter. Det privata näringslivet kan både vara en 
partner och utgöra en stark och positiv drivkraft för att främja 
hållbar utveckling. Detta kan ske både genom att tillföra 
innovationer och finansiella resurser till utvecklingsarbetet och 
genom att tillämpa socialt och miljömässigt hållbara principer i 
sin egen kärnverksamhet. Näringslivet kan involveras ett flertal 
områden som sammanfaller med Sveriges sex biståndsmål. 
Dessa sex mål är: (i) stärka mänskliga rättigheter (ii) bekämpa 
fattigdom (iii) verka för en hållbar miljö (iv) förbättra 
grundläggande hälsa (v) värna mänsklig säkerhet och frihet från 
våld och (vi) humanitär hjälp.   
c. Inte en universallösning. JDIs kan inte förväntas fungera i alla 
lägen, utan är istället lämpliga för att möta vissa mål, inom vissa 
områden och under vissa omständigheter. Denna typ av 
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samarbeten ska därför ses som ett komplement till andra 
former av bistånd. JDIs är ofta inte lämpliga då målet är att 
inkludera de mest utsatta grupperna i ekonomisk tillväxt, att 
bygga sociala skyddsnät för de grupper som av olika 
anledningar inte kan delta fullt ut i lokala tillväxtprocesser, att 
bygga institutioner, eller att utveckla god praxis i ekonomisk 
och social politik. Därför bör givare etablera breda och 
komplementära engagemang med den privata sektorn och 
försöka åstadkomma synergier mellan dessa samarbeten och 
andra insatser.   
d. Behov av riskhantering. Det är viktigt att undvika samarbeten 
som bidrar till ineffektiva eller i värsta fall skadliga 
biståndsinsatser; konkurrensstörande insatser, insatser med 
begränsat mervärde, låg utväxling per biståndskrona, projekt 
som inte är hållbara på sikt, samt projekt där samarbetsländerna 
inte är involverade eller känner ansvar för processen. Dessa 
risker förekommer i snart sagt alla former av 
biståndssamarbeten och är inte specifika för de som involverar 
privata sektorn. Icke desto mindre kan JDIs behöva skärskådas 
särskilt noga, eftersom många av dessa insatser representerar 
nya former av samarbeten. 
Svenska JDI-partnerskap: en inventering.   
Att kartlägga existerande instrument och projekt i Sveriges 
biståndsportfölj är problematiskt av i huvudsak två anledningar. För 
det första utgör JDIs ett rörligt mål som är under ständig förändring, 
och därmed finns ingen bred eller uttömmande lista av partnerskap lätt 
tillgänglig. För det andra är det problematiskt att hitta konsistenta och 
jämförbara data för de olika interventionerna. Därmed finns en risk att 
den information som används i rapporten underskattar det totala 
antalet partnerskap och investeringarna i dessa insatser. Med dessa 
förbehåll har vi identifierat och sammanfattat de mest betydande 
partnerskapen i svenskt utvecklingssamarbete, som kan grupperas 
enligt följande mål:   
a. Innovativa investeringar är insatser som leder till nya och 
innovativa investerings-initiativ, vilka anses ha potential för att 
bidra till ekonomisk utveckling och öka den privata 
finanseringen av utvecklingsinsatser. Dessa investeringar 
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inbegriper så kallade Challenge Funds, garantier och lån, samt 
aktieinvesteringar, lån och gåvobistånd via Swedfund. 
Motiveringen utifrån ett biståndsperspektiv är att 
investeringar som kan tänkas erbjuda stora samhällsvinster – 
utöver investerarens privata vinst – kan behöva offentligt stöd 
eller delat risktagande för att komma till stånd i den 
högriskmiljö som råder i ett flertal utvecklingsländer.   
b. Insatser som bidrar till hållbarhet i näringslivets kärnverksamhet 
och stöder rättigheter, genom att främja näringslivssamarbete 
inom exempelvis arbetsrätt, miljöskydd, anti-korruption, osv., 
med syfte att åstadkomma drivkrafter för hållbara principer. 
Inom detta område stöder Sida civilrättsorganisationers 
arbete, men samarbetar även direkt med näringslivet genom 
sin Private Public Development Partnership (PPDP) 
modalitet. Inom detta område förväntas utvecklingseffekterna 
komma till stånd som ett resultat av ökat fokus på hållbara 
arbetsmetoder i det privata näringslivet. Detta påverkar 
anställda arbetare direkt, men har även indirekta effekter på 
övrig lokalbefolkning genom att det allmänna näringsklimatet 
påverkas av insatserna.  
c. Partnerskap för utveckling, som oftast syftar till att skapa 
”offentliga nyttigheter”. De flesta av Sida’s PPDPs avser att 
dra in privat finansiering i den sociala och ekonomiska 
utvecklingens tjänst. Inom denna ram förväntas 
samhällseffekterna av investeringarna överstiga den privata 
avkastningen.   
Vår kartläggning av svenska JDIs visar i korthet följande:  
a. Även om de faktiska utbetalningarna till JDIs troligen är 
större än de uppskattningar som redovisas i denna rapport, är 
Sveriges samarbeten med den privata sektorn förhållandevis 
begränsade, både betraktat som andel av biståndet och jämfört 
andra länder. Enligt våra beräkningar uppgick år 2014 Sidas 
direkta och indirekta samarbeten (exklusive garantier), till 0.8 
procent av Sveriges totala biståndsbudget. Kapitaltillskott till 
Swedfund bidrog samma år med ytterligare 1.3 procent av 
biståndsbudgeten. Som en jämförelse stod exempelvis 
humanitärt bistånd och samarbete med civilsamhället genom 
Sida för 10 procent respektive och 6 procent av totalen. Som 
internationell jämförelse kan exempelvis nämnas att 
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näringslivs-samarbeten genom Danida uppgick till 
uppskattningsvis fyra procent av Danmarks totala budget för 
bilateralt och multilateralt samarbete.   
b. Sidas samarbeten med den privata sektorn har emellertid ökat 
mellan 2011 och 2014, från 0.4 till 1.1 procent av Sidas totala 
budget. Inom ramen för Sidas garantiportfölj uppgick värdet 
av de garantier som initierades 2011-2012 till en fjärdedel av 
dem som påbörjades 2013-2015.   
c. Huvuddelen av Sidas finansering (garantier undantaget) riktas 
till Challenge Funds – över 60 procent i 2013 och 2014. Det är 
dock viktigt att notera att kartläggningen inte inbegriper 
ramavtal med Union to Union  (eftersom dessa inte 
kategoriseras som JDIs av Sida).2 Om man inkluderar detta 
ramavtal – vilket inte vore helt orimligt, eftersom det är ett 
instrument för att stärka rättigheter i samband med privata 
sektorns aktiviteter – skulle huvuddelen av Sidas finansiering 
istället vara inriktat på att stödja hållbara arbetsmetoder i 
näringslivets kärnverksamheter i utvecklingsländerna.  
d. I ett regionalt perspektiv är finansieringen mestadels riktad 
mot så kallade globala fonder; av de enskilda regionerna är 
Afrika viktigast. Över hälften av värdet av Swedfunds totala 
investeringsportfölj är också koncentrerad till Afrika och 
fokus på Afrika har ökat över tiden. På liknande sätt har 
garantier i första hand ett globalt fokus, följt av Afrika. Två 
tredjedelar av Sidas partnerskap är globala program. PPDPs är 
dock koncentrerade till Afrika och Asien.   
e. Även om JDIs, liksom Sveriges bistånd i stort, är obundet, har 
svenska företag flitigt förekommit i de olika samarbetena, 
särskilt inom PPDPs.  
I vilken mån kan då dessa partnerskap möta Sveriges biståndsmål?3   
a. Sidas partnerskap fokuserar på att minska fattigdom och öka 
social integration, några genom direkta länkar till fattiga 
grupper (till exempel Challenge Funds som Innovations 
Against Poverty) och andra där länkarna till 
                                                                                                                                                          
2 Union to Union hette tidigare LO-TCO Biståndsnämnd. 
3 Notera att detta är en översikt över vilka mål programmen förväntas möta (i teorin); inte 
huruvida programmen i praktiken lyckas med detta. 
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fattigdomsminskning måste ses som mer indirekta 
(exempelvis yrkesskolor). Stöd till civilrättsorganisationer 
syftar till att stärka mänskliga rättigheter. Det finns däremot 
inga direkta länkar till biståndsmålen för humanitär hjälp eller 
konfliktlösning, förutom i den mån investeringar och program 
förläggs till postkonfliktzoner/länder.  
b. En översikt av Swedfunds investeringsportfölj visar att dessa 
investeringar i huvudsak kan väntas bidra till målet om att 
minska fattigdom (genom förväntade spridnings-effekter från 
allmän ekonomisk tillväxt och jobbskapande och andra 
positiva effekter från investeringar i industri, infrastruktur och 
energi).  
Joint Development Initiatives och principer för effektivt 
bistånd  
Kartläggningen visar att de instrument som ryms inom ramen för JDIs 
potentiellt kan vara viktiga inom några av de tematiska områden som 
prioriteras i svenskt bistånd. Huruvida dessa insatser de facto lyckas 
med detta förutsätter både bra projektplanering och implementering, 
och att insatserna klarar av att hantera de risker som kan uppstå. I vår 
rapport diskuteras principerna för effektivt bistånd och de konflikter 
som kan uppstå i ljuset av exempel från Sveriges nuvarande insatser. 
Några av huvudprinciperna kan sammanfattas enligt följande:  
Fokusera på de mest utsatta länderna och befolkningsgrupperna. 
Svenska JDIs har ett tydligt och vällovligt fokus på låginkomstländer, 
vilket är helt i linje med Sveriges biståndsmål. Koncentrationen till 
låginkomstländer i Afrika har ökat över tiden. Samtidigt står det också 
klart att fattigare länder, särskilt post-konflikt länder, lider av låg 
institutionell kapacitet och höga kostnader kopplat till privat 
företagsamhet, på grund av undermålig infrastruktur, korruption, 
svaga regelverk, och så vidare. Länder med små inhemska marknader, 
liten köpkraft, och instabila förhållanden är i allmänhet inte särskilt 
intressanta för näringslivssamverkan. Det är också tydligt att i de 
länder där JDIs förekommer är de allra fattigaste grupperna sällan de 
som direkt kan förväntas gynnas av initiativen. Det är svårt att 
involvera dessa grupper som entreprenörer/producenter eller rent av 
som arbetskraft, eftersom de många gånger begränsas av lågt 
humankapital i form av sämre hälsa och lägre utbildning. För att de 
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fattigaste grupperna ska kunna dra nytta av JDIs krävs att insatserna 
skapar ekonomisk tillväxt som både omfattar stora 
befolkningsgrupper och har starka spridningseffekter. Detta är dock 
inte fallet i alla utvecklingsländer. Förväntningarna på de direkta 
effekterna av programmen för de fattigaste behöver alltså anpassas. 
Samtidigt bör projekten sträva efter att stärka systemeffekter och 
spridningseffekter så att deras indirekta påverkan blir starkare. 
Samtidigt kan (svenska) företag vara mycket väl lämpade att hjälpa 
utvecklingsinitiativ i medelinkomstländer som inte längre kvalificerar 
för svenskt bistånd men som fortsatt kämpar med fattigdom, hälso- 
och miljöproblem för stora delar av befolkningen (Sydafrika och 
Indien är sådana exempel). Ett slags utvecklingsagentur, till exempel i 
form av en help-desk på svenska ambassader, skulle kunna öka 
sannolikheten att potentiella och värdefulla initiativ faktiskt kan 
genomföras även i sådana länder. Svenska företag, eller filantroper, 
skulle på så vis kunna få hjälp att slussas till lokala partners, såsom 
civilrättsorganisationer, andra givare på plats, eller likasinnade företag.  
Komplementaritet. Kan givare bidra med annat än samfinansiering i 
JDIs? Frågan är särskilt relevant i de fall där projekten involverar stora 
internationella företag med egna resurser. Värdet av att ingå 
partnerskap är naturligtvis högre om det bidrar med mer än finansiella 
resurser. Privata företag och entreprenörer har teknisk och 
organisatorisk kunskap, förstår sin egen värdekedja, och utgör en källa 
till innovation. Men även biståndsorganisationerna kan också bidra 
med mera än finansiering. Erfarenhet visar att i samarbeten som Sidas 
PPDPs är givarsidans engagemang uppskattat därför att det innebär ett 
åtagande att bidra med utvecklingsexpertis, dela risker kring anseende, 
bidra med kunskap kring god praxis i andra länder, ge en 
godkännandestämpel angående utvecklingsvärdet av insatser, hjälpa till 
att engagera lokala partners, och ge tillgång till givar- och 
civilsamhälleliga nätverk. För de insatser som syftar till hållbarhet i 
företagen och rättigheter i samband med detta kan givarmedel även 
möjliggöra att organisationer från det civila samhället kan bidra med 
kompetens inom sina specialområden, så som barnrättigheter,  
genusperspektiv, hälsa, osv.   
Marknadsutvecklande, inte marknadsstörande. Att binda bistånd till 
upphandling från givarländer innebär effektivitetsförluster. För det 
första innebär det ofta dyrare lösningar för mottagarländerna (det 
finns uppskattningar som visar på minst 20 procents överpriser) och 
för det andra snedvrider det användandet av biståndsmedel till 
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områden som passar givarens snarare än mottagarens behov. Med 
mycket få undantag är svenskt bistånd obundet. Trots detta har den 
svenska portföljen av JDI-insatser, särskilt PPDPs, hittills präglats av 
en relativt stor svensk representation. Detta framstår mer som en följd 
av en naturlig och stegvis process när det gäller både marknadsföring 
av samarbetsmöjligheter och identifieringen av möjliga partners, vare 
sig det gäller Challenge Funds, hållbar affärsverksamhet, eller PPDPs. 
När nu erfarenheterna från de första projekten och programmen 
utkristalliseras och en andra fas inleds har också programmen stegvis 
öppnats upp mera tydligt. För att fortsätta i den andan bör man nu 
försöka vända sig till nästa grupp av företag både i Sverige och från 
andra länder, såsom de som ännu inte utvecklat expertis eller avsatt 
större resurser till CSR, eller företag som har mindre press utifrån att 
stärka hållbarheten i sin verksamhet.  
PPDPs är kanske den projekttyp som löper särskild risk att 
subventionera individuella företags specifika behov. Risken för sådan 
subventionering kan minskas om man försöker strukturera projekten 
så att förmånerna är flyttbara till andra företag (till exempel teknisk 
utbildning som är relevant för många företag) och gärna också flera 
olika sektorer, och som maximerar systemiska effekter, till exempel 
genom att redan från början involvera flera olika företag i projekten.   
Hållbarhet: lokalt ägarskap, harmonisering och samordning. Agendan 
för biståndseffektivitet fokuserar bland annat på att öka 
programmatiskt bistånd och minska projektorienterade ad-hoc 
insatser samt på att involvera och utveckla kapacitet i 
mottagarländerna. Dessa principer står delvis i motsats till den typ av 
projekt som ofta initieras av en allians mellan företag och givare, som 
riskerar att samvariera med konjunkturen, och som ibland omfattar 
företag med begränsad erfarenhet av att hantera lokala myndigheter 
och civilsamhället i mottagarländer. Det finns med andra ord en hög 
risk för att bistånd blir utbudsdrivet och fokuseras på områden som är 
relevanta för givarländers kompetens eller kommersiella prioriteter 
istället för de mest prioriterade områdena från ett utvecklings-
perspektiv. Riskerna kan i viss mån kontrolleras, exempelvis genom att 
investeringarna styrs till särskilt utvecklingsrelevanta sektorer (detta är 
redan fallet för Challenge Funds och garantier, men skulle också 
kunna göras mer systematiskt också för andra former av partnerskap). 
Hållbarhet och lokalt ägarskap främjas även i de fall projekt och 
program involverar det lokala civilsamhället eller lokala myndigheter 
från ett tidigt stadium, samt i de fall det finns en tydlig exitstrategi för 
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givare från början.  Breda samarbeten,  med lokala företag eller andra 
utländska företag som är verksamma lokalt, kan också bidra till att 
projekten blir mera hållbara.    
Mäta resultat och öka systemeffekter. Svenska JDIs, och i synnerhet 
Challenge Funds och PPDPs, utformas som piloter: projekt som i 
princip ska kunna skalas upp eller replikeras om de visar sig vara 
effektiva. Pilotansatsen förutsätter att programmen är sammansatta så 
att det är möjligt att dra tydliga slutsatser kring deras effektivitet och 
påverkan. Många analytiska verktyg har utvecklats för att tydliggöra 
projektens underliggande logik och mäta resultat, både på projekt- och 
systemnivå. Betydligt mer kan dock göras för att sprida resultat och 
uppmuntra till att projekt med goda utfall replikeras av andra länder, 
givare, och företag. Det är allmänt känt att givarsamhället i stort 
behöver koordinera och kommunicera bättre kring olika projekt. När 
väl projekt replikeras i olika miljöer (såsom Sida/Volvos PPDPs för 
yrkesutbildningar) uppkommer värdefulla möjligheter att byta 
erfarenheter mellan likartade projekt.   
Biståndseffektivitet är också en funktion av redovisningsansvar och 
transparens, både med avseende på omfång och användande av 
resurser. Vare sig Sida eller Swedfund har för närvarande möjlighet att 
publicera lättillgänglig och tydlig information om partnerskapens 
utformning. Detta får anses vara ett resultat av svagheter i 
informationssystemen snarare än försök att dölja relevant information. 
Oavsett den underliggande orsaken är och förblir transparens en 
nyckelprincip för att öka förtroendet för effektivitet i 
utvecklingsarbetet. Inte minst är transparens viktigt i partnerskap med 
privata företag. I korthet innebär detta att ansträngningar med syfte 
att stärka rådande system för att både samla in och presentera 
information på hemsidor och i Openaid.se bör öka.   
Rekommendationer 
Rapportens huvudrekommendationer kan sammanfattas i sex punkter: 
1. Det behövs tydligare ansträngningar för att dokumentera 
och rapportera kring JDIs, både med avseende på uppsatta 
mål, sammansättning, resursanvändning, ansvars-
fördelning och eventuella kända utfall. Grundläggande 
fakta (budget, målgrupp, företagpartners, och liknande) 
för alla program under JDI-temat bör insamlas och 
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redogöras för som grupp; detta bör ske på ett konsekvent 
och lättillgängligt sätt. Utöver denna miniminivå är 
regelbundna och systematiska utvärderingar och 
övergripande analys av hela mängden pilotinsatser 
nödvändiga. Sådana ansträngningar hjälper till förbättra 
framtida projekt genom att visa hur hållbarhet och 
systemeffekter kan stärkas och hur man skalar upp och 
anpassar program till nya länder, sektorer, områden, osv. 
2. Nya former av JDIs bör introduceras relativt försiktigt, 
såsom hittills skett. I dagsläget råder fortfarande brist på 
utvärderingar kring effekter och resultat som av JDIs, 
särskilt i vidare mening. Sett i termer av totalt svenskt 
bistånd förblir JDI-portföljen liten. Det är rimligt att 
fortsätta att utveckla dessa program gradvis, i takt med att 
information om vilka pilot projekt som varit 
framgångsrika för svenska så väl som andra initiativ 
utkristalliseras. 
3. JDIs ska inte i huvudsak ses som ett substitut för 
traditionellt bistånd, utan snarare ett komplement. Inom 
flertalet viktiga områden för utveckling, till exempel 
institutionsstärkande instatser, är JDIs sannolikt inte 
effektiva. 
4. Det finns anledning att ge särskild prioritet till samarbeten 
som omfattar civilsamhällets aktörer bland Sidas program. 
Denna typen av partnerskap har en stor potential för att 
stärka hållbart företagande, om organisationer får stöd för 
påtryckningsarbete, och i samarbeten där deras expertis 
används i företagens CSR-arbete.   
5. Nya program, särskilt inom Sidas PPDPs, bör också söka 
samarbeten bortom de största svenska multinationella 
företagen. Man kan också fokusera på att involvera fler 
företag som ännu inte utvecklat expertis eller avsatt större 
resurser till CSR, eller företag som har mindre press 
utifrån att stärka hållbarheten i sin verksamhet.  
6. En informell utvecklingsagentur kunde etableras i valda 
svenska ambassader i länder som inte längre kvalificerar 
för svenskt bistånd, men där utvecklingsproblem 
fortfarande kräver lösning, och där svenska företag kan 
vilja söka andra lämpliga partners för olika JDIs.   
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Summary 
Development is opening up for business  
Sweden’s Policy for Global Development aims to ensure that actions 
across all policy areas work towards equitable and sustainable global 
development. The aim of Sweden’s international development 
cooperation is to create preconditions for better living conditions for 
people living in poverty and under oppression. These objectives 
correspond well with those of the wider donor community (Swedish 
Government, 2014). 
However, while the objectives of development cooperation have 
not changed fundamentally over time, there is an increasing 
recognition that new mechanisms and partnerships will be needed in 
order to achieve them. Private investment to developing countries has 
surged since the 1990s, reaching even low income countries, with 
notable impacts on local economies and living standards. Meanwhile, 
traditional official development assistance (ODA) has become 
relatively less important as a source of financing and a driver of 
change. These dynamics increase the pressure to form new 
partnerships between private and public actors in order to deliver 
more effective aid as well as to catalyze new sources of financing and 
knowledge for development.  
As a result, in both the donor community and the business sector – 
in Sweden as well as in other countries – there is a growing interest in 
developing partnerships for development between the private sector 
and the public sector. This report refers to such collaborations as Joint 
Development Initiatives (JDIs). The potential benefits of making 
better use of the innovative and financial capacity of firms for 
development are clear. However, these partnerships may also be 
accompanied by a risk for conflicts and tensions between development 
objectives and business interests. In particular, there may be 
contradictions between the commercial objectives of the private sector 
and the (often) longer term concerns of the aid effectiveness agenda, 
which focus on objectives such as broad systemic change and 
spillovers, local ownership and harmonization, improved market 
efficiency, transparency, and untying aid from donor country 
commercial interests. Moreover, because of the rapidly changing and 
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diverse character of these new forms of collaborations, there are few 
comprehensive evaluations available as a basis for judging whether 
they actually are effective in meeting their objectives.  
Against this background, this report provides a mapping of existing 
Joint Development Initiatives in Sweden, reviews their relevance with 
respect to the different objectives of aid set out by Sweden, and 
discusses whether, where, and how the associated risks can be 
mitigated in order to ensure effective aid delivery. Because of the 
evolving nature of collaborations and the paucity of evaluations – 
largely due to the fact that programs are too new to have been subject 
to systematic evaluations (yet) – this report does not attempt to 
provide any full assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
different instruments.  
The report is based on the following pillars: 
a. One overarching objective: Development. Commercial interests 
may be a mechanism for attracting private sector engagement 
for the benefit of development, but this report does not 
consider it an objective in itself. For this reason, donor funding 
for JDIs is motivated if such funding enhances development 
effects and adds value by facilitating investments, which 
otherwise would not have taken place. It is not intended to 
subsidize commercial enterprise or corporate social 
responsibility activities that would be undertaken even without 
the partnerships.  
b. Strong potential benefits. The business sector can be a positive 
force and partner in development, both by contributing 
innovation and financial resources, and by ensuring sustainable 
business practices. It can address some of the areas under the 
six development objectives set up for Sweden’s development 
agenda: (i) Strengthened human rights; (ii) Poverty reduction; 
(iii) Environmental sustainability; (iv) Improved basic health; 
(v) Reducing conflict, and; (vi) Humanitarian aid.  
c. Not a silver bullet. JDIs can only be expected to meet some 
objectives, in some areas, and under certain circumstances. It 
should be seen as a complementary engagement to other areas 
of development cooperation, not least to include the most 
vulnerable groups as well as providing safety nets for those 
who cannot take part in growth, institutional strengthening, 
and best-practices in public policy. Donors should therefore 
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seek broad and complementary engagements with the private 
sector and should aim to harness synergies between these, as 
well as other forms of partnerships.  
d. Need to mitigate risks. There is a need to avoid partnerships that 
result in ineffective or even harmful aid, uncompetitive 
practices, limited additionality of interventions, low value for 
money, unsustainable projects, and low partner country 
involvement and limited local ownership. These are obviously 
risks that may apply to all forms of development co-operation, 
not only those involving the private sector, but particular 
attention is warranted because JDIs are new forms of 
development cooperation. 
An inventory of Swedish partnerships 
Mapping existing interventions is difficult for two reasons. First, JDIs 
are an evolving area and no comprehensive or exhaustive lists of 
partnerships are readily available. Second, there are difficulties 
involved in finding consistent and comparable data for different 
interventions. Thus, the data used in this report are likely to 
underestimate the total number of partnerships and related resources. 
Given these caveats, we have identified and summarized the most 
notable existing partnerships in Swedish development cooperation. 
They include:  
a. Innovative investments that pilot new and innovative 
investment initiatives with a potential for contributing to 
development and leveraging private financial resources. These 
investments encompass Enterprise Challenge Funds (CFs), 
guarantees and loans4, as well as equity investment, loans and 
grants through Swedfund. The reasoning behind the role of 
investments for development is that investments that carry 
large social benefits may need public funding or shared risk 
taking in order to be realized or to take off in the risky 
environments that characterize many developing economies.  
b. Making business activities sustainable and supporting rights by 
supporting industry cooperation around initiatives like labor 
                                                                                                                                                          
4 In addition, there are grants to supplement loans. 
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standards, environmental protection and anti-corruption 
measures in developing countries, aiming to create a “race to 
the top” in terms of good practices. In this area, Sida supports 
civil society organizations’ (CSO) advocacy and 
collaborations around such issues. In addition, Sida 
collaborates directly in areas of sustainable business practices 
through its Private Public Development Partnership (PPDP) 
modality. Here, the development impact is expected to evolve 
through increased attention to sustainable practices in the 
business sector, which will benefit workers directly, as well as 
local populations more broadly. 
c. Partnership initiatives for development, often in the form of a 
public good. Most of Sida’s PPDPs are used to leverage 
private financing for development benefits that have positive 
effects beyond those realized by the individual partner firm.   
In sum, our mapping of Swedish JDIs highlights the following:  
a. Even if actual disbursements are higher than those estimated 
here, Sweden’s private sector collaborations are modest both 
as a share of development cooperation and with respect to 
other countries. In 2014 Sida’s direct and indirect 
collaborations, excluding guarantees, amounted to 
approximately 0.8 percent of Sweden’s total budget for 
development cooperation. Swedfund’s annual capital injection 
for the same year accounted for another 1.3 percent of the 
total. In comparison, spending on humanitarian aid and on 
collaborations with Swedish NGOs through Sida amounted to 
about 10 and 6 percent respectively of the total development 
budget. As an international comparison, business programs 
managed by Danida, Denmark, amounted to around four 
percent of the country’s total budget for bilateral and 
multilateral assistance.  
b. Sida’s collaborations have nonetheless increased recently, 
doubling from 0.4 percent to 1.1 percent of its total budget 
over the 2011-2014 period. The value of guarantees starting in 
2011-2012 was only one-quarter of those starting in 2013-
2015. 
c. Most of Sida’s funding, apart from guarantees, is directed to 
Challenge Funds – over 60 percent in 2013 and 2014. Here, 
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however, the mapping excludes the framework agreements 
with Union to Union  (since Sida does not categorize it as a 
JDI). If these agreements were included – as they conceivably 
could be, being an instrument to strengthen rights in relation 
to private sector development – most of Sida’s funding would 
be directed towards sustainable business practices.  
d. In terms of regional focus, funds are largely directed to global 
funds, followed by African countries. Over half of the value of 
Swedfund’s total portfolio of investments is concentrated in 
Africa, and the focus on Africa is increasing. Similarly, 
guarantees largely have a global reach, followed by Africa. 
Two thirds of Sida’s other partnerships are in global programs. 
However, PPDPs are more significantly concentrated in 
Africa and Asia.  
e. Although programs are formally untied, Swedish firms 
frequently participate in these programs, especially in the 
PPDPs.  
How well do these partnerships address areas of focus for Swedish 
development cooperation? Currently, JDIs focus largely on three 
broad development objectives: i) removing bottlenecks to growth 
(which is expected to result in poverty reduction through trickle-
down effects); ii) rights connected with private business activities in 
developing countries (labor, land, and gender rights), and; iii) 
sustainable environment.5 We find that Sida’s partnerships are focused 
on poverty reduction and inclusion, some with a direct link to the 
poor (such as challenge funds like Innovations Against Poverty) and 
others, where links must be considered as more indirect (for example 
vocational schools). Support to Drivers-of-Change addresses the 
agenda of strengthening rights. There are however, no direct or 
explicit links to humanitarian assistance or conflict resolution, except 
in those cases where some investments and programs are located in 
post-conflict countries or zones. 
A review of Swedfund’s investment portfolio suggests that poverty 
reduction (through the assumed trickle-down effects from overall 
economic growth and job creation in addition to other positive 
                                                                                                                                                          
5 Note that this is a review of what objectives the program is attempting to meet, not 
whether it actually succeeds in doing so. 
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spillovers from investments in industry, infrastructure, and energy) is 
the main focus of these investments. 
Joint Development Initiatives and principles of effective 
aid  
The overview shows that the instruments available for JDIs have the 
potential to address some of the thematic areas that are highlighted in 
Swedish development cooperation. Whether they will actually do so in 
each specific case hinges both on good project planning and execution, 
and on whether they can mitigate the risks and maximize the 
opportunities related to different forms of collaborations. This report 
discusses the principles of effective aid and potential areas of conflict, 
incorporating examples from the current Swedish portfolio of 
interventions. Some of the main principles are highlighted in the 
following paragraphs. 
Targeting the most vulnerable countries and groups. Swedish JDIs 
have a significant and commendable focus on low income countries. 
Moreover, the concentration on low income countries in Africa has 
increased over time. However, poorer countries, and especially fragile 
states, suffer from low institutional capacity and high costs for doing 
business due to poor infrastructure, corruption, and weak regulatory 
frameworks. Countries with very small markets, limited purchasing 
power, weak institutions, and unstable conditions are not generally 
major recipients of programs involving private business. It is also 
obvious that the poorest groups in the countries that host JDIs are 
rarely likely to benefit directly from the programs: it is often difficult 
to involve the poorest groups as producers or even direct beneficiaries 
of job creation, since they are handicapped by low levels of skills and 
health. Inclusive economic growth and strong trickle-down effects are 
necessary prerequisites in order for the poorest population groups to 
be able to benefit from public-private partnerships. These 
prerequisites are not always in place. Hence, expectations regarding 
the direct impact of programs on the poor need to be moderate, and 
efforts to strengthen systemic effects and spillovers to increase the 
indirect effects need to be integrated in the projects.  
It should be noted that Swedish companies may be well placed to 
further development initiatives in middle-income countries that no 
longer qualify for Swedish ODA, but where significant poverty, 
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health, or environmental threats still influence large parts of the 
population (e.g. South Africa and India). A development broker 
facility – e.g. a help-desk at the Swedish Embassy – that could help 
Swedish firms (or philanthropists) to identify potential local partners 
(CSOs, other donors, or like-minded private firms) would be of great 
value and would raise the likelihood that potential initiatives are 
realized. 
Partnership complementarities. Do donors add value apart from co-
funding? The question is especially pertinent when larger international 
firms with substantial financial resources are involved. Naturally, the 
value of partnerships is enhanced when more than funding is brought 
to the table. Private companies and entrepreneurs have technical and 
managerial know-how, understanding of their value-chain, and are the 
source of innovations. Donors may also bring a variety of resources to 
partnerships, aside from financial capital. Experience shows that donor 
involvement, such as in Sida’s PPDPs, is valued because it implies a 
commitment to provide development expertise, share reputational 
risk, help form interventions that are based on best-practice examples 
from other countries, provide a stamp of approval in terms of 
development value for the interventions, help engage local 
governments, as well as offering access to donor and civil society 
networks. With regard to sustainable business practices and 
strengthening rights, the donors’ contributions aid civil society 
organizations in using their technical competence in their specific 
areas of expertise (child rights, health, environment) in collaboration 
with the private sector.  
Developing, not disturbing markets. Tying aid to procurement from 
donor countries carries costs in terms of efficiency. First, it imposes 
solutions that typically imply welfare losses for recipient countries, 
with mark-ups estimated to exceed 20 percent. Second, it diverts 
development funds to areas of donor country interest rather than 
recipient country needs. With very few exceptions, Swedish aid is 
untied; however, the Swedish portfolio of interventions and especially 
PPDPs has significant Swedish participation. This is the result of a 
natural step-by-step approach in terms of marketing and identifying 
partners, whether for challenge funds, sustainable business practices, 
or for PPDPs. As lessons from the first projects and programs are 
beginning to materialize, and programs are moving into a second 
phase, attempts to delink are in fact emerging. A way forward for 
increasing additionality of interventions in the area of sustainable 
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business practices and PPDPs may be to consider the next layer of 
firms, in Sweden and elsewhere, which do not yet have the expertise or 
resources dedicated to corporate social responsibility (CSR), or firms 
that are less affected by external pressure to act in a sustainable 
manner. 
PPDPs in particular run the risk of subsidizing the specific needs 
of  individual firms involved in the partnerships. These risks can be 
mitigated if projects are structured in a manner that allows benefits to 
be transferrable (for example, vocational training is relevant for 
different firms and ideally for different sectors), and that maximizes 
systemic effects, e.g. through broader partnerships with other firms. 
Sustainability: local ownership, harmonization and coordination. The 
aid efficiency agenda focuses on moving toward more programmatic 
and less project oriented development cooperation, and on developing 
and incorporating recipient country competences in the process. This 
process is partly at odds with the fact that projects are often initiated 
by a firm/donor alliance, the risk that projects depend on business 
cycles, and the lack of experience among foreign firms in dealing with 
local government and civil society in recipient countries. The risk of 
aid being supply driven and focused on areas of competence or 
commercial interest rather than local development priorities is high. 
These risks can be mitigated, for example by steering investments to 
more development relevant sectors and areas (which has already been 
done with Challenge Funds and guarantees, but could be applied more 
systematically to other forms of partnerships as well). A set-up that 
involves capacity building with local NGOs and engagement with 
national authorities and civil society, in combination with a clear exit 
strategy, is likely to help build ownership early on. Collaborations 
with a wide group of partners, including other private firms, could also 
help ensure sustainability.  
Measuring results and fostering systemic impact. Private sector 
partnerships in Swedish development cooperation, especially CF and 
PPDPs, take the form of pilots: projects that, in principle, can be 
scaled up or replicated if proven effective. The pilot approach, 
however, assumes that programs are designed to provide clear lessons 
for a wide range of stakeholders. There are different tools available 
with regard to articulating program logic and indicators of change, 
both at a project and system level. More emphasis will be needed on 
dissemination of results and replication of pilot projects. A 
comprehensive approach to identifying and disseminating lessons 
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learned is needed. Donors in general need to coordinate and 
communicate better across different projects. As projects become 
more streamlined (such as Volvo/Sida collaborations around technical 
schools), important opportunities for cross-project learning, which 
should be taken advantage of, arise. 
Aid effectiveness also relies on accountability and transparency 
regarding the size and use of resources. Neither Sida nor Swedfund are 
currently able to provide readily available and transparent information 
on the different characteristics of partnerships, such as the identities 
of collaborating firms and total commitments. This lack is the result 
of weaknesses in information management, rather than explicit 
decisions to avoid disclosure of information. However, transparency 
remains a key principle for building confidence in development 
effectiveness and should be respected in each of these partnerships.  
Recommendations 
The recommendations proposed in the report can be summarized in 
the following six points: 
1. Better documentation, reporting, and use of information of 
programs is needed, and more discernible disclosure of 
information. Basic facts (costs, beneficiaries, private sector 
partners, and similar) for the entire set of programs involving 
JDIs should be collected and publically available under one 
program heading. Beyond basic program information, periodic 
and systematic evaluation efforts of the group of interventions 
are necessary, taking a wholesale look at the collected evidence 
of different pilot experiments. This will help strengthen the 
preparation of interventions by showing how systemic effects 
can be promoted, how sustainability can be ensured, and how 
replication and up-scaling can be achieved once/if pilots have 
proved to be successful. 
2. New forms of public-private partnership forms should be 
introduced with caution (as has been the case so far). There is 
still a lack of comprehensive evidence on effects and results of 
JDIs. The portfolio of interventions is currently relatively 
small and it makes sense to develop it gradually, based on 
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what has shown to work with different pilots, for Sweden and 
other countries.  
3. JDIs should not primarily be seen as a substitute for more 
traditional aid instruments, but rather as a complement. In 
many important areas of development cooperation, including 
institution building, JDIs are not likely to be efficient 
instruments.  
4. Collaborations between civil society organizations and firms 
should receive particular priority in Sida’s programs. There is a 
strong potential for strengthening sustainable business 
practices if selected civil society organizations get public 
support to carry out their watchdog and advocacy functions 
and/or to act as experts in collaborations with firms.   
5. New programs should be designed to reach beyond the largest 
Swedish multinationals. Expansion both towards 
multinational firms that are active in partner countries, and 
towards the next generation of Swedish multinational firms, 
could be considered.  
6. An informal development broker facility should be established 
in selected Swedish embassies in countries that have graduated 
from Swedish aid programs, to help firms identify other 
appropriate partners for such projects.    
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1 Introduction  
The aim of Sweden’s international development cooperation is “to 
create preconditions for better living conditions for people living in 
poverty and under oppression” (Swedish Government, 2014, p. 13). 
With a foundation in the national Policy for Global Development, 
Swedish development cooperation is based on two perspectives: that 
of individuals’ living in poverty, and that of rights, notably human 
rights, democracy, gender equality and children’s rights (Swedish 
Government, 2003). The core of these ambitions and approaches has 
not changed fundamentally over the past decades and is well aligned 
with those of the wider donor community (The Busan Partnership 
Declaration, 2011). 
In recent years, new approaches and mechanisms have emerged for 
achieving these development goals, prompted both by the 
globalization and interdependence of firms, jobs and information, and 
by the rise of both new actors and new challenges in the development 
agenda. Traditional official development assistance (ODA) is 
becoming less significant in terms of financing and delivering 
development (World Bank, 2013). These dynamics increase the 
pressure for delivering more effective aid, in addition to catalyzing 
new sources of financing and knowledge for development. 
Private enterprise is a precondition for economic development. A 
vast majority of jobs in poorer countries are in the private sector, 
primarily low productivity sectors like agriculture and labor-intensive 
services. It is only through better jobs and higher earnings that 
poverty levels can be reduced over the longer term. Improving the 
business environment for both local and foreign firms, small as well as 
large (generally referred to as support to Private Sector Development, 
or PSD), has been a priority area in the development agenda for some 
time, including for Sweden.6 The “theory of change” – i.e. the 
underlying model for how development is expected to happen – for 
improving conditions for innovation and private enterprise activity 
and job creation in developing countries is not controversial. 
Economies are expected to grow when individuals have the right to 
manage their own productive resources in an environment with 
                                                                                                                                                          
6 Specifically, Sweden’s official development aid has been focused on “making markets work 
for the poor”, or M4P, where the central idea is that interventions should help market 
systems work better for the poor so as to improve their livelihoods (Sida, 2003). 
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reasonable economic institutions and incentives, including private 
ownership rights and rule of law. While the theoretical foundation is 
sound, it is less clear what kinds of interventions involving private 
sector actors actually work in practice. There are few comprehensive 
evaluations of impacts, and although private sector development may 
be a necessary condition for economic development, it appears to be 
far from sufficient to ensure more inclusive growth (Sinha et al., 
2013). 
The private sector is also a possible agent of change as a partner in 
the delivery of development benefits. Donors, including Sweden, now 
look to collaborate directly with international and domestic private 
companies, ranging from smaller firms to large multinational 
enterprises, in order to mutually increase the development impact of 
development finance, to strengthen the development leverage of 
private enterprises’ core business activities, as well as to harmonize 
and align development oriented efforts. Specifically, in 2014, the 
Swedish government instructed Sida, the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency, as well as other actors in Swedish 
development cooperation, to actively seek opportunities for 
partnerships with the private sector. The objectives were to leverage 
financial resources, technical competence, innovation/entrepreneurial 
spirit, and best-practice business standards available among private 
firms and business organizations (Swedish Government, 2014, p. 50). 
The rapprochement of business, traditional donors and civil society 
organizations (which have for a long time been collaborating with 
donors) reflects a global trend of partnering around common 
interests, manifested in e.g. the UN Global Compact. The increased 
focus on multi-partner partnerships is also evident in major global 
processes in development taking place in 2015, largely led by the UN: 
the Paris Climate Conference (COP21), the Financing for 
Development Conference in Addis Ababa, and the Sustainable 
Development Goals for 2015 and beyond, all of which demonstrate 
the increased role attributed to the private sector. 
The growing interest in public-private partnerships in the 
development debate and the specific Swedish mandate to increase 
these collaborations, together with the focus on result-based aid, 
suggests that more information is needed on the different forms of 
public-private development partnerships. This report provides an 
overview of existing partnerships in Sweden, discusses how well they 
can be expected to meet different objectives of aid, and whether, 
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where, and how the associated risks can be mitigated in order to 
ensure effective aid.  
1.1 Approach and delimitations 
This report focuses on partnerships in development cooperation that 
involve the private sector as an active partner contributing to 
development objectives, and not primarily as a deliverer of goods and 
services. We refer to these partnerships as Joint Development 
Initiatives (JDIs). In Sweden, the increasing interest in these 
partnerships is anchored in the interface between the objectives of 
Swedish development cooperation and those of the private enterprise 
sphere. This interface includes direct business/investment interests in 
areas with great significance for development and poverty reduction. 
It also includes principles and practices that improve the inclusiveness 
and environmental and social impact of the way private firms conduct 
business, loosely defined as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
The report is restricted to partnerships leveraged by Sida and 
Swedfund, excluding initiatives managed by the Foreign Ministry. We 
also specifically exclude public-private partnerships (PPPs) in 
infrastructure and public services delivery. These are defined as 
projects where private firms provide part of the services or works that 
fall under the responsibilities of the public sector, with long term 
agreement on the respective roles and responsibilities of both parties 
(building and operating a toll road, for example). Although Sweden in 
the recent past has contributed funds to multilateral programs for 
infrastructure PPPs, there is very little involvement of Swedish 
companies, no clear interface between Swedish development 
cooperation and the private enterprises that are involved, and no clear 
sharing of engagement or responsibility for development benefits. 
Another important reason for not focusing on infrastructure PPPs is 
that there are already relatively many studies of these types of 
partnerships in the literature (see, for example, OECD, 2007; Andrés 
et al., 2008; Graeme et al., 2012, and World Bank, 2012a). Studies of 
other types of partnerships are scarcer. 
The report does not purport to provide a full evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the different initiatives for several related reasons. 
First, the number of public-private partnerships in development is 
expanding and existing partnerships take different forms with 
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different characteristics, rules of the game, and objectives. This makes 
it difficult to provide a comprehensive mapping let alone make general 
appreciations of outcomes. Second, several initiatives are 
comparatively new and the Swedish system is undergoing a gradual 
transformation. As a result, not enough time has passed in order to 
allow for informed conclusions with regard to their effectiveness.7 
Third, there is a paucity of broad systematic and comprehensive 
efforts to evaluate the outcomes of these forms of development 
partnerships, both in Sweden and globally.8 A meta-level systematic 
review of existing program level evaluations in this area is much 
beyond the scope of the study, but would be a very useful next step on 
the research agenda.  
Although we refer frequently to existing studies on various forms 
of public-private partnerships, we are not aiming to provide any 
exhaustive literature survey on the topic. This would also require a 
separate research effort that lies beyond the scope of the present 
report. As a result, we take a broad rather than deep approach. Our 
focus is on mapping out existing initiatives to the extent possible, 
discussing how to maximize opportunities and minimize risks, and 
exploring what can reasonably be expected from these partnerships. 
The report is based on a review of s sub-set of the literature on the 
topic, data work, and semi-structured interviews with a select number 
of donors, companies, and civil society organizations.9 
1.2 Premises 
The rationale behind exploring potential synergies between public and 
private actors – so called “win-win” situations – is clear. The private 
sector is a significant source of knowledge and financial resources, and 
coordination around the development agenda can be assumed to be 
beneficial. However, there are also potential conflict areas between 
specific development objectives and the objectives of private 
                                                                                                                                                          
7 Two critical reviews of public and private partnerships in Sweden, undertaken in 2011 and 
2014, show important changes in the number and characteristics of projects in the portfolio 
of initiatives (Resare, 2011, 2014). 
8 This is despite ongoing efforts by the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development 
(DCED), shorter overviews of private sector involvement in Swedish development 
assistance including Resare (2011, 2014), Devfin Advisors (2014), Billing et al.  (2012), 
Lindahl (2009), and work by Adam Smith International (2009). 
9 A list of interviewees is available in Annex 2. 
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enterprises. The aid effectiveness agenda has come to focus on broad 
systemic change and spillovers, local ownership, improved market 
efficiency, transparency, and untied aid. These principles can, at times, 
prove to be inconsistent with private firms’ legitimate concerns 
regarding profitability and return on investment, competitive 
advantage, protection of brand specificity, and partnership with other 
actors, including local government and competitors.   
The report is based on the following general assumptions. 
a. Development is the objective of JDIs. Using the example of 
Sweden, the report focuses on how public sector donors can 
collaborate more efficiently and effectively with the private 
sector for the purpose of improving development outcomes 
and reducing poverty. Commercial interests are not 
considered an objective from the point of view of donors. We 
acknowledge that partnerships are built on mutual benefits, 
but win-win situations are from this point of view a 
mechanism for engaging the private sector, rather than an 
objective in itself.  
b. A thriving and responsible private sector is a necessary 
condition for sustainable and inclusive development over time. 
It is a source of innovations, jobs and earnings, as well as tax 
revenues that can be used to support development friendly 
policies in general. There are strong arguments in favor of 
involving the business sector as a positive force and partner in 
development, to contribute know-how, technology, and 
financial resources, and to improve sustainable business 
practices and links between private enterprise and poor 
population groups.  
c. However, private sector collaborations are not a magic silver 
bullet for development: they complement measures to 
strengthen institutions and to introduce best-practices in 
public policy. Donors should promote broad and 
complementary engagements that focus on including the most 
vulnerable groups and provide safety nets for those who 
cannot take part in business activities and commerce.  
d. The choice between various forms of interventions and 
approaches in private and public collaboration matters. There 
is a need to avoid negative consequences, including 
uncompetitive practices, limited additionality of interventions 
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and low value for money, unsustainable projects, and low 
partner country involvement and limited local ownership. 
1.3 Organization of the report 
The remainder of the report is organized as follows.  
a. The second section provides the framework for discussing how 
the private sector can contribute to meeting Swedish 
development objectives, and how development cooperation 
can support that role. The section also identifies opportunities 
and risks related to JDIs.  
b. The third section looks at the forms of partnerships that de facto 
exist in Sweden’s development cooperation today as well as 
those planned for the coming years. Here, we also discuss the 
theory of change behind the interventions, and how these 
correspond to the objectives of aid.  
c. Drawing on the framework presented in section 2, the fourth 
section identifies the specific effectiveness issues that either have 
already emerged or can be expected to arise in these different 
forms of partnerships, as well as what is known about their 
overall effectiveness (with respect to their individual goals) in 
delivering results and in meeting aid objectives. Due to the 
fact that many of these interventions are still in their early 
phase, this discussion is necessarily kept at a conceptual level. 
d. The fifth section highlights the main conclusions and findings 






       
29 
2 Leveraging Private Sector 
Involvement for Development  
The interest in collaborations with the private sector is driven by the 
realization that the private sector has a significant and increasing 
influence on development through its commercial activities in poorer 
countries. The private sector also harbors strong innovative capacity 
that can be useful for resolving poverty related problems. At the same 
time, it is clear that public-private partnerships are not likely to be 
effective in meeting the full range of objectives towards sustainable 
development. This section provides a background to the growing 
interest in public-private collaborations and a discussion of where and 
how they can contribute to economic development and poverty 
reduction. 
2.1 A changing landscape in developing countries 
Private capital flows and transfers to developing countries have 
increased significantly over the past 25 years. Critical factors behind 
this surge include macroeconomic stability, reforms leading to the 
opening up markets to foreign investment, multilateral trade 
liberalization, in addition to other improvements in the business 
environment in the great majority of the world’s developing 
economies. The globalization of value chains in the production of 
goods and services has encompassed poorer countries as well. The 
developing world is both a potential location for high yielding 
investments and a growing customer base for products and services. 
As a result, private capital flows in the form of investment 
(primarily foreign direct investment, FDI, but to some extent also 
portfolio equity) and transfers (remittances) have become much more 
important than ODA flows as a source of external capital for 
developing countries as a whole. Because of the dominance of direct 
investment, these flows have not been debt creating, unlike capital 
inflows in the past (Dorsey, 2008).  ODA is in fact becoming 
irrelevant as a source of capital for lower middle income countries 
(Figure 2.1, a). The significance of FDI is increasing rapidly even for 
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low income countries.10 Together with remittances, FDI inflows are 
now as important as ODA inflows even for this country group 
(Figure 2.1, b). This shift in favor of private capital flows is a relatively 
recent phenomenon with a surge after 2000. The share of low income 
countries in global FDI and portfolio investment remains small, 
reflecting both the more risky business environments and the scarcity 
of business opportunities (Figure 2.1, c). Nonetheless, private capital 
is of major importance in developing countries, even the poorest ones. 
Enhancing the development effect of these flows has a significant 
potential for economic growth and poverty reduction, at a time when 
actual official development cooperation flows are leveling out. 
In addition, new actors and powers are emerging, both in the 
international business and the international development arena. The 
BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China), together with other 
economic powers like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Indonesia, are 
increasing both their presence and influence in low income countries. 
Information on ODA from emerging economies is scant, since these 
new suppliers of development finance have chosen not to coordinate 
information through the DAC reporting system. Recent estimates 
nevertheless suggest that between 2000 and 2011, China committed 
USD 75 billion in official flows (development assistance and 
development finance) to Africa. This represents almost as much as US 
commitment and nearly one fifth of total OECD-DAC flows during 
the same period (Strange et al., 2013). Total concessional flows from 
emerging economies to low income countries were estimated at 
around USD 12 billion in 2011 (World Bank, 2013). Similarly, private 
philanthropy flows are increasing, exemplified by the Bill and Melissa 
Gates Foundation. Private aid today is estimated at approximately 
USD 60-70 billion per year (World Bank, 2013). 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                          
10 The increasing importance of FDI for countries at low levels of income and development 
has been recognized also in the international business literature; see e.g. Narula and Dunning 
(2010). 
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Figure 2.1: Flows of Investments and Transfers   
a. In lower middle income countries (billion USD) 
 
b. In low income countries (billion USD) 
 
c. Low income and Lower middle income countries, as share of 
global flows and output 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi. For 
2014-2015, lower middle income countries are defined as countries with per 
capita GNI between USD 1046 and USD 4125; low income countries as countries 
with per capita GNI of USD 1045 or less, as per http://data.worldbank.org/about/ 
country-and-lending-groups.  
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2.2 New partnerships 
In parallel with the increasing presence of international firms in low 
income countries, more attention has been paid to new partnerships 
for development. In 2000, the UN launched its Global Compact, 
which invited businesses to adopt and account for environmental and 
socially responsible policies, stating ten principles in the areas of 
human rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption. Further, the 
Aid Effectiveness Agenda, which was also launched in the early 2000s, 
focuses on the modernization, deepening and broadening of 
development cooperation and the delivery of aid (OECD, 2014). The 
process of establishing principles for increasing the development 
impact of aid has been brought forward through several high level 
forums (in Rome in 2003, Paris in 2005, Accra in 2008, Busan, 2011 
and Mexico City, 2014). The private sector has been recognized as a 
full partner in delivering and accelerating development at least since 
the high level forum in Busan, Korea, in 2011. 
The opening up to private sector contributions is based on the 
growing importance of the business sector as a driver of growth and 
provider of jobs and product and services solutions that can help the 
poor. In addition, it is assumed that an ambitious development agenda 
will require financing flows of a magnitude that ODA is not likely to 
generate by itself. The focus, in other words, is not only on leveraging 
finance from the private sector, but also to make full use of the 
innovative capacity and know-how found in the business sector. 
At the same time, private businesses have gradually developed their 
CSR activities from pure philanthropic engagements, where part of 
firm profits are used to support a development project, towards 
partnerships aiming to achieve broader development goals related to 
their core activities. A mix of factors is likely to motivate and form 
this development. Firms (or rather, their owners, managers, and 
employees) may have a genuine interest in contributing to poverty 
reduction and may therefore welcome the opportunity to bring their 
ideas and know-how to the table. Large multinational enterprises that 
are subject to public scrutiny may, at the same time, face pressure to 
account for the sustainability of the entire value chain related to their 
activities and those of their sub-contractors. In a long term 
perspective, they may look to contribute to building a future client 
base in developing countries; in a short term perspective, they are 
interested in building good-will at home and abroad. The rise of social 
       
33 
media as a global source of information on business practices and the 
role of different watchdog institutions in highlighting unsustainable 
practices contributes to these motives. There is also a new generation 
of entrepreneurial talent for whom social entrepreneurship is seen as a 
central and viable business idea. 
In tandem, the vision of partnerships is slowly evolving from 
projects where the private sector is primarily a delivery mechanism of 
development cooperation to constellations where the private sector 
can also become a full partner in providing development benefits. 
Sweden has also moved in this direction. The 2009 DAC peer 
review of Swedish Development Assistance recommended that 
Sweden invest in building partnerships that enhance the involvement 
of the private sector in development (OECD, 2009). The Swedish 
government’s Aid Policy Framework, presented in 2014, emphasizes 
the role of private sector activities, both in terms of innovative 
capacity, and in terms of the impact private business has on social and 
environmental sustainability, as well as the inclusiveness of economic 
growth in their core business. The strategy stresses the importance of 
meeting the principles of effective aid also in these partnerships (Box 
2.1). 
Box 2.1: New Partnerships in Swedish Development Policy 
“Sweden must also work in partnership with private enterprise. It is in private 
enterprise that the foremost opportunities can be found for creating employment 
that enables people who live in poverty to earn a living. The private sector also has 
a fundamental role to play in terms of contributing financing, new solutions, 
products and services that are adapted to the needs and purchasing power of 
people living in poverty. Private enterprise often also has an opportunity to 
directly affect areas that are central to people’s living conditions, such as human 
rights, the environment and corruption. One fundamental principle when aid 
cooperates with actors in the business sector is that all cooperation must 
contribute towards the overarching objective of aid – the needs of people living in 
poverty and under oppression must be the starting point of all operations. In the 
same way as with collaboration with other actors, cooperation with the private 
sector must be characterised by openness, transparency and cost-efficiency. It 
must also be independent, results-focused and avoid disrupting the market. 
Cooperation with industry should be characterised by high requirements in terms 
of CSR.” 
Source: Government of Sweden (2014), p. 50. 
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With the exception of the very poorest countries, private capital 
inflows are likely to continue to outgrow inflows of ODA. These 
trends provide strong reason to focus on improving the development 
impact and quality of private flows, ensuring sustainable and inclusive 
economic growth patterns, strengthening human rights, and 
combating corruption related to their core activities. In addition, 
partnerships may help direct the innovative capacity and knowledge 
and the financial resources of the business sector to specific 
development projects. 
In a parallel process, the internationalization of civil society has 
accelerated and international NGOs have become increasingly 
important partners in development cooperation. International 
organizations like the World Bank, the IMF, and the EU Commission 
were using international NGOs to carry out various development 
projects already in the 1980s, but changes in aid objectives have given a 
more central role for NGOs since that time (Siméant, 2005; 
Lindenberg and Bryant, 2001). As environment, sustainability, health, 
democratization, and human rights – areas traditionally championed 
by NGOs – have been included among the key ODA targets, NGOs 
have not only become more important for aid implementation: the 
development of civil society has become an end in itself.11 The 
increasing concern among international investors for corporate social 
responsibility reflects these broader societal concerns, and has brought 
civil society also into the boardrooms of the world’s leading 
multinational corporations. As a result, NGOs are increasingly 
interacting directly with the corporate sector, both in order to 
advocate their specific objectives and to provide advice and expertise 
for those firms that wish to establish more responsible policies. 
The private sector, the public sector (donors), and civil society 
bring different advantages to collaborations, and gain different 
rewards (Table 2.1). Official donors can bring funding for projects as 
well as local connections and institutional knowledge. They can also 
bring legitimacy, from a sustainable development perspective, to the 
project, and development knowledge, including insights on relevant 
priorities and on program effectiveness, as well as the ability to scale-
up successful initiatives. In return, donors may gain increased financial 
                                                                                                                                                          
11 In the Swedish case, it should be noted organized bilateral aid has always been closely 
linked with civil society, and that Sida actually traces its descent to a civil society 
organization established in 1952, the Central Committee for Swedish Technical Assistance  
(Centralkommittén för svenskt tekniskt bistånd). See e.g. Dahnsdotter and Ewald (2014). 
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and technical resources for development in areas and countries that 
benefit less from purely private investment flows, innovations to 
reduce poverty, and more sustainable economic development from 
private investment. 
Table 2.1: The Nature of Win-Win-Win 








knowledge, scale,  






Innovation and technology, 
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On-the-ground 
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impact in focus areas 
New sources of 
financing 
Source: elaboration by authors with input from www.ppplab.org 
 
The private sector brings financial resources, innovative capacity, 
business know-how, and commercial viability (where applicable). The 
potential benefits for the private sector include cost-sharing, as well as 
risk and reputation sharing for development oriented projects, good-
will and long term market development, access to local stakeholders, 
and help in increasing the development focus of projects.12 They can 
also potentially gain competitive advantages through reduced 
                                                                                                                                                          
12 Interview with H&M, IKEA, Ericsson, Maersk, Löfbergs Lila and Tetra Laval. 
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competition, although this goes against the principles of effective aid. 
Civil society, finally, can bring the on-the-ground contacts and 
expertise including implementation capacity, raise issues and concerns, 
and contribute to legitimacy. Meanwhile, civil society stands to gain 
influence and achieve a higher development impact in their focus 
areas, and new sources of financing. Potentially, partnerships 
including the private sector, the public sector, and civil society may 
result in win-win-win situations, where all three partners gain various 
benefits in return for their contributions to projects or programs. 
2.3 Race to the top or race to the bottom   
As stated, this report takes its starting point in one primary target, 
namely improving the conditions for people living in poverty and 
under oppression. The Aid Policy Framework from 2014 establishes 
six more specific objectives for Swedish development cooperation to 
operationalize this goal. While the exact formulation and priorities 
among the specific aid objectives may change over time, they pertain 
to themes that have long featured in Swedish development 
cooperation and are likely to remain in one form or other.13 The 
specific objectives are to: (i) Strengthen human rights; (ii) Reduce 
poverty; (iii) Achieve environmental sustainability; (iv) Improve basic 
health; (v) Reduce conflicts, and; (vi) Provide humanitarian aid. 
The use of public funds for partnerships with the private sector 
would be warranted under two conditions: (i) The private sector has a 
role to fill in reaching some of these development goals; (ii) A 
partnership with a donor can raise the positive development impact of 
private business activities (in most case, by addressing some market or 
government/institutional failure) without endangering the principles 
of effective aid and without distorting markets and competition. 
The Aid Policy Framework also sets the principles for delivering 
aid towards the development objectives as effectively and efficiently as 
possible. The principles aim to ensure that aid programs: (i) are 
targeted to women and girls in poor countries and people who live 
under oppression; (ii) are owned by the recipients; (iii) are 
harmonized, coordinated, and predictable; (iv) focus on results; (v) are 
characterized by transparency and shared responsibility; (vi) are 
                                                                                                                                                          
13 A new Aid Policy Platform is under preparation and will be presented in 2016. 
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innovative and flexible; (vii) are based on partnership; (viii) fight 
corruption, and; (ix) provide value for money without disturbing 
markets. 
While there is general agreement that the private sector can do 
much for development, there is less evidence on how well partnerships 
using public funds meet the conditions of effective aid. There is a 
potential for a “race-to-the-top”, where firms improve sustainable 
business practices and increasingly use innovative capacity for 
development. At the same time, there may be a risk of a “race to the 
bottom”, where donors reverse the gains made in untying aid, and 
increasingly support companies from their home country to improve 
their international competitiveness. Risks include subsidizing 
companies’ commercial ventures, CSR practices, or social marketing 
campaigns, the high costs associated with tied aid, losing focus on 
other key development areas where private sector contributions are 
likely to be limited, as well as lower transparency in development 
finance, due to limited access to business accounts. It is also 
inherently difficult to prove that ventures are additional, both in the 
sense of adding value to development, and whether they would have 
happened without public funding (see e.g. Kwakkenbos, 2012; Resare, 
2011, 2014; Byiers and Rosengren, 2012; and interviews as per 
Annex 4). 
Annex 1, Table A1, provides an overview of aid objectives, the 
potential contributions of the private sector, and the role of 
development cooperation in a possible partnership with the private 
sector. A working hypothesis is that these types of partnerships work 
better towards some objectives than others, and that some risks with 
these partnerships can be mitigated better or more completely than 
others. Private sector collaborations have the potential of 
strengthening rights, especially those related to labor and land, and 
may also contribute positively to anti-corruption measures that ensure 
fairness in the use of public resources. They can help bring income 
opportunities to poor groups who act as workers or producers within 
the value-chains, or bring about innovative solutions to specific issues 
affecting the poor. The private sector can also provide technology and 
other solutions to enhance environmental sustainability and improve 
basic health. Their investments can potentially be targeted to 
particularly vulnerable countries and innovations related to the 
delivery of humanitarian aid can come from the private sector. 
Depending on the level of risk and the size of markets, many of these 
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collaborations can evolve without additional public funding. However, 
there are also instances where donor funding can help convoke 
different parties, position interventions within the long term 
development strategy of the country, and share financial and 
reputational risks related to desirable investments. 
At the same time, there can be areas where the private sector is less 
able to improve development outcomes. The private sector may help 
promote sustainable business practices, but it is not obvious how 
business may contribute to democracy building and human rights 
more broadly. Projects with women and children as target groups, 
projects focusing on social protection and basic education, 
investments in conflict zones, and humanitarian aid are some other 
areas where JDIs involving the private sector are less likely to be 
common. 
These opportunities for collaboration also need to respond to 
donors’ commitments in order to deliver effective and value-for-
money assistance. Based on the principles of effective aid delivery laid 
out in the Swedish Aid Policy Framework (which in turn stem from 
the international dialogue on aid effectiveness), it is obvious that 
private sector collaborations correspond well with the requirements to 
focus on innovative and flexible solutions, as well as broadening 
partnerships. However, with respect to other principles, both 
opportunities and risks can be identified.14 Some of these are 
illustrated in Table A2, Annex 1. 
A first area of potential conflict arises already when target groups 
are identified. Markets in low income countries, in conflict zones, in 
rural areas, and involving the poorest groups, are likely to be less 
interesting for private business. Targeted interventions can focus 
investment on poorer countries, but identifying interventions that 
directly involve the poor as employees or producers in value chains is 
challenging. 
Another difficult issue concerns local ownership. The decision to 
allow private sector initiatives should ideally be anchored in local and 
long term agendas. However, since many JDIs are instigated by and 
linked to the commercial operations of the participating private sector 
                                                                                                                                                          
14 It is important to point out that some tensions between the principles may arise 
irrespective of who is delivering aid. For example, the requirements to be innovative and 
flexible yet results based, and to ensure harmonization, coordination and predictable aid 
flows at the same time, are not obviously easy to meet simultaneously. 
       
39 
firms, this may hard to achieve in the early stage of projects. Particular 
caution is needed when aid programs involve areas where donors’ 
home countries or specific home country firms are considered to have 
specific competitive advantages. The risk in these cases is that 
interventions are designed based on what donor country firms want to 
do rather than on what is most urgently needed for local development 
in the recipient country. 
A related problem concerns the tying of aid. There are significant 
effectiveness and efficiency cost connected to tied aid, and evaluations 
suggest that mark-ups on procurement prices of tied aid exceed 20 
percent, with even higher mark-ups for high technology goods or 
services (Clay, 2008). However, even if collaborations are not formally 
tied to donor country firms, there is still a tendency for these firms to 
be overrepresented in aid projects. This may be particularly 
pronounced for JDIs. When JDIs are established, it is natural that 
many of them will involve donors and their home country firms. If it 
is a private firm that initiates the collaboration, they will tend to seek 
collaboration with the donor that they are most familiar with – often 
the one in their home country. Similarly, where collaborations are 
driven by civil society organizations or public sector institutions, they 
are more likely to find partners from their existing networks, where 
home country firms are more prominent than others. 
Differences between corporate and institutional cultures may also 
lead to complications. Firms exposed to competitive pressures have to 
deliver visible benefits in order to remain in business. Their actions 
and expectations tend to be permeated by a results-driven culture that 
may add strength to development strategies. At the same time, firms 
and donors may not agree on the definition of a satisfactory result for 
development or what constitutes a reasonable time lag to measure 
impact. Firms may find monitoring and evaluation procedures that 
meet donor requirements burdensome.15 Moreover, firms may be even 
more sensitive to reputational risk than donors and therefore reluctant 
to divulge publicly learned lessons from different projects, if these are 
anything but successful. This hinders the sharing of information and 
experiences that can inform future projects. Another significant 
challenge is the lack of transparency that follows from mixing public 
funds with private business investment information, which is sensitive 
                                                                                                                                                          
15 These concerns were also reflected in several of the interviews with company 
representatives. 
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from a commercial point of view. Transparency regarding the use of 
public money, not only for donor partners, but also for external and 
independent actors like civil society, journalists, and researchers, is an 
important basis for effective public financial management. 
In sum: there are ample opportunities for private sector 
collaborations to contribute to several of the objectives of Swedish 
aid. However, this does not apply across all areas of interests, nor for 
all target groups. In order to ensure effective aid delivery, there is a 
need to avoid or mitigate the risks that arise, especially with regard to 
focus, transparency, and impact on competition. 
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3 Joint Development Initiatives in 
Swedish Development 
Cooperation: An Inventory  
This section provides an overview of key forms of JDIs, involving the 
private sector in Swedish development cooperation. It contains the 
history of the changing role of private sector involvement in Sweden’s 
development cooperation, an overview of current programs and their 
focus and objectives, summarizes the size and direction of flows, and 
discusses how well this corresponds to the Swedish aid objectives. The 
purpose is to understand the significance of this phenomenon in the 
context of the overall size and direction of Swedish aid flows, the 
balance of different initiatives, as well as the relative weight of 
different development objectives addressed by the instruments under 
the broad JDI umbrella.  
3.1 Background 
Although the types of Joint Development Initiatives that are at the 
core of the present analysis are relatively new phenomena – for 
example, Sida’s B4D platform was established in 2010 – it is important 
to note that collaborations with the private sector have a much longer 
history in Swedish development cooperation. The first government 
agency focusing on development cooperation was the Council for 
International Assistance, NIB (Nämnden för internationellt bistånd), 
established in 1962. The rationale for development aid and the 
framework for NIB’s operations were summarized in a Government 
Bill from the same year (Government Bill 1962:100). The Bill stated 
that the overall objective of Swedish cooperation was to raise the 
standard of living of poor people, but that aid in itself would not be 
sufficient to achieve this goal. Instead, economic growth, which was a 
necessary prerequisite for poverty reduction, would require the joint 
efforts of many different actors, including local governments, private 
entrepreneurs from the developing country, as well as investors from 
other countries (see SOU 2006:108). The role of commercial actors 
from Sweden (and other developed countries) was perceived as 
particularly important. Foreign direct investment and other types of 
commercial contacts were to provide the capital, entrepreneurship, 
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technology, and vocational skills needed to accelerate the development 
process. 
Thus, one of the objectives of Swedish development aid was to 
facilitate and support commercial relations between Sweden and 
developing countries. Liberal trade and investment policies were 
strongly promoted, in addition to other instruments like export credit 
guarantees and credits for investment in infrastructure and industry. 
Swedish industry was a natural partner in NIB’s activities, as well as in 
the operations of the Swedish International Development Authority, 
SIDA, which came to replace NIB in 1965. The credits provided to 
partner countries were often used for contracting Swedish partner 
firms, although they were not formally tied to Sweden; the export 
credit guarantees were explicitly intended to help Swedish firms 
overcome the risk and uncertainty related to transactions with 
developing countries. 
The role of the private sector was still emphasized in the early 
1970s, when private sector development in partner countries was 
introduced as an explicit aid objective. The experiences from the 1960s 
suggested that liberal trade policies were not sufficient with to 
generate sustainable economic growth, and that more direct support 
for industrial development was needed. Two arguments were 
emphasized in particular.16 First, against the backdrop of the 
increasingly radical political climate of the late 1960s, there was a 
perceived need to raise awareness about the importance of private 
sector development as an engine for economic development. Second, 
there was a belief that Swedish technological know-how could be 
particularly useful for the development process. The establishment of 
a development finance institution in the form of Swedfund in 1978 
was also part of this process. According to its statutes, Swedfund was 
expected to “promote the establishment and development of industrial 
enterprises in developing countries” through equity investment, loans, 
and guarantees, as well as networking and funding of feasibility studies 
and pilot projects. The underlying assumptions were that many 
developing countries would welcome FDI from Sweden, and that 
these investments would contribute not only to job creation and tax 
revenue, but also to spillovers of technology and management skills. 
                                                                                                                                                          
16 The case for private sector development was made in the “Inquiry on Industrial 
Assistance” (Industribiståndsutredningen), SOU 1972:90. 
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Private sector participation was obviously essential to reach these 
goals. 
There were also contradictory developments during the 1970s. The 
holistic approach to development cooperation that had characterized 
the 1970s began to change, and strong arguments were made in favor 
of separating development cooperation from commercial interests. 
The objective of commercial business – profit – was more and more 
frequently seen to be incompatible with the goals of development aid 
– economic and social development in recipient countries. Some of the 
instruments used during the 1960s were removed from the aid 
portfolio (export credit guarantees), and others disappeared entirely 
(investment guarantees). SIDA’s organization changed, with a more 
defined separation between “pure” development aid and activities 
involving the private sector. For example, a separate agency was 
established with the purpose of managing technical training programs 
and collaborative projects and development credits (“u-krediter”). The 
development credits were given the dual purpose of promoting 
development in recipient countries and engaging Swedish industry in 
development cooperation. This new agency, known as BITS 
(Beredningen för internationellt tekniskt-ekonomiskt samarbete), 
became the main interface between the development sphere and the 
private sector. The macroeconomic developments during the 1970s 
and early 1980s, including the oil crises and the increasing debt 
burdens in developing countries, also shifted attention away from 
economic growth as the main objective of development aid. Structural 
adjustment, write-offs of debt, and increasing focus on 
democratization and human rights were strong characteristics of the 
Swedish aid portfolio from the early 1980s to the 1990s. 
Further concentration of private sector oriented activities came 
about as a result of another reorganization of Swedish aid 
administration in the early 1990s. Swedecorp, the Swedish 
International Enterprise Development Corporation, was created in 
1991 through the merger of SIDA’s department for industrial 
development (Industribyrån), Swedfund, and IMPOD, an agency 
promoting imports from developing countries. The objective was to 
manage Swedish assistance in the area of private sector development, 
focusing on three areas: human capacity development, business 
development, and credits. After just four years, Swedecorp was 
absorbed in 1995 into the new development agency, which was 
established through the merger of SIDA, BITS, Swedecorp, and 
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SAREC (the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with 
Developing Countries). Sida represented, at least in organizational 
terms, a return to the holistic vision that had been drawn up in the 
1960s with the first incarnation of SIDA – only Swedfund remaining 
separate from the Sida umbrella. However, the relationship between 
the aid agency and the private sector was less intimate than it had been 
in the early 1960s, and it was not uncontroversial within the Sida 
organization to argue that private business could be – or should be – 
engaged in international development efforts.17 It is not until the 
recent decade that public-private partnerships have returned to the 
development agenda as potentially important mechanism for 
development aid. 
3.2 A mapping of current partnerships  
The mapping of ongoing partnerships is tentative, for several reasons. 
First, as discussed in the introduction, business partnerships are a 
moving target. Sida launched its Business for Development (B4D) 
program in 2010 as a pilot initiative, and the stepwise and flexible 
approach of the initiative has implied that the program itself has 
changed in character over time. Partly as a result of this, no 
comprehensive or exhaustive lists of partnerships are readily available. 
The mapping exercise is further marred by difficulties in finding 
consistent and comparable data on commitments. 
With these caveats in mind, the map of Swedish partnerships below 
is loosely based on the following categorization from Adam Smith 
International (2009):  
a. Innovative investments for development: piloting new and 
innovative investment initiatives with a potential for 
contributing to development, including those that may have a 
positive “demonstration effect”, e.g. in environmental 
protection, and through leveraging private finance.  
                                                                                                                                                          
17 The view that Sida only had a limited interest in the potential contributions of the private 
sector until relatively recently was evident in several of the interviews with corporate 
representatives. One of the authors, who was a member of Sida’s Board of Directors during 
several years from the late 1990s, can report similar observations from inside the 
organization; it was not until after the turn of the millennium that the perception that 
commercial interests and development are contradictory began to fade away. 
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b. Making business activities sustainable and supporting rights: 
including efforts to increase industry cooperation around 
initiatives like labor standards, environmental protection and 
anti-corruption measures in developing countries, to create a 
“race to the top” in terms of good practices.18 
c. Partnerships to support development initiatives: often aiming to 
create or strengthen a public good, with a positive impact on 
the business environment. 
Using this typology, the most notable existing partnerships in 
Swedish development cooperation are summarized in Table 3.1. It 
includes programs defined as private sector collaborations by Sida, as 
well as Swedfund’s activities. It also serves the purpose of identifying 
the complementary role (potentially) played by development 
cooperation, which underpins the additional value of public funding. 
What is the development logic behind these interventions and what 
are the underlying assumptions with regard to trickle down 
mechanisms from projects to the objectives of Swedish aid? The 
different approaches are briefly presented below. Where applicable, 
categories are illustrated with examples from the existing portfolio of 
interventions.   
 
                                                                                                                                                          
18 It should be noted that socially and environmentally responsible actions on the part of 
private companies are a prerequisite for all collaborations. 
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Table 3.1: Swedish Development Cooperation: Joint Development Initiatives 
Form of 
Partnership 





Innovations Against Poverty, Africa 
Enterprise Challenge Fund, Seed 
Alliance, Powering Agriculture, Making 
All Voices Count 







Global Health Fund,  
Health Guarantee Uganda, African 
Guarantee Fund 





AfricInvest (equity fund) 
Various companies especially industry, 
energy 








Various sectors, strong focus on China, 
India 
Co-funding, risk sharing, 
market knowledge 
Sustainable Business Activities 
Sida: Drivers of 
change (NGOs) 
Business Call to Action, 
Child rights and business program, 
Swedwatch, 
SWHAP (Swedish HIV and Work Place 
program) 





Sida: PPDPs Coffee and Climate Initiative 
Market transformation Initiative 




Partnership initiatives to support development activities/public goods    
Sida: PPDPs Milk for Schools (Tetra Pak school 
feeding) 




knowledge, risk sharing 
(reputational, financial), 
knowledge management 
Note: PPDP = Public-Private Development Partnership. Source: Compilation by 
authors. 
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Innovative investments 
Challenge Funds (Sida) are a financing mechanism with the objective 
of allocating (donor) funds for specific purposes, using competition 
among organizations. The purpose is to strengthen market outcomes 
with a developmental impact. Projects should have the potential to be 
commercially viable, but warrant risk sharing at early stages, without 
which activities would not take place or would be delayed (ODI, 
2013). Challenge Funds (CFs) are used in a variety of contexts, also 
by Sida. The focus in the present analysis is on the CFs that involve 
businesses, under some or all windows. So called Social Funds, which 
focus on NGOs, are not included. Under this umbrella, Sida’s CFs 
focus on innovations that benefit the poor population groups in 
general – Innovations Against Poverty, Africa Enterprise Challenge 
Fund – or rural populations and agricultural productivity in particular 
-  e.g. Seed Alliance or Powering Agriculture. 
The underlying assumptions are that (i) significant innovative 
capacity does exist in the private sector, and that this capacity can be 
harnessed with the purpose of resolving a development challenge; (ii) 
competition spurs innovation, and (iii) new partners – and their 
human and financial resources – which otherwise would not have been 
engaged in development-related work now can be brought into the 
process. The initiative (the identification of the development 
challenge) comes from the donor, but since the CF is defined with 
respect to a specified goal, while not defining the means to reach that 
goal, innovation and creativity can be unleashed. CFs also leverage 
funds because private partners are expected to provide 50 percent or 
more of total costs. In case they are geared to stimulating local 
partners and local solutions, the CFs can contribute to local 
ownership. The potential contribution to development objectives may 
vary depending on the “challenge”, which could be related to health, 
environment, or other innovations that can benefit the poor directly. 
The funding involved is never expected to subsidize firm operations 
per se, but rather focus on specific projects related to the Challenge. 
Challenge Funds could potentially be used by smaller firms; however, 
they require capacity within the firm to comply with conditions 
regarding, for example, measurement and reporting of results. Because 
of their focus on innovative firms, CFs must necessarily accept a 
relatively high level of risk. Examples of notable Sida programs are:  
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• The Innovations Against Poverty (IAP) program, which focuses 
on companies operating in poor countries. Innovation in any 
sector can be supported, as long as it is expected to benefit the 
poor directly. The program is set up as a risk sharing 
mechanism for sustainable business ventures that have strong 
potential to impact poverty – the interventions are focused at 
the innovation or development stage.   
• Making All Voices Count, a global fund financed by, among 
others, USAID, DfID, and Omidyar Network. The fund 
supports innovative technical platforms to engage and improve 
the dialogue between governments and its constituents.  
Innovative Finance (Sida) includes guarantees as well as grants to 
complement loans in areas and projects with a development focus.19 
Sida, together with USAID, appears to be unique among bilateral 
agencies in having an active guarantee program.20 The purpose of 
guarantees is to leverage financing from the private sector where it can 
contribute to development goals, but share in risk taking in different 
forms. The guarantee instrument is very efficient in leveraging 
contributions by the private sector at potentially very low cost, since 
the guarantee may never need to be invoked. Guarantees take on 
different forms, including “first loss guarantees” that, from a financial 
stand point, resemble equity investment, albeit without ownership 
responsibilities; advanced market commitments, which guarantees a 
viable market, typically for a health related product like vaccines; or 
reinsurance guarantees, which provide insurance that need to be 
invoked in e.g. natural disasters (Devfin Advisors, 2014). Sida’s 
guarantee portfolio currently covers health, market development, 
environment, and infrastructure (Sida Guarantee Fact Sheet, provided 
by Sida). 
The motivation behind these instruments is that the public benefit 
of the potential investment is larger than the benefit to the private 
investor, and that these investments would not have happened, or 
would not have happened as quickly lacking some form of risk 
sharing. The advantage from a development perspective is that, with a 
                                                                                                                                                          
19 No data has been made available to the authors on the amount or direction of grants used 
to complement loans. 
20 Sida has been able to use the guarantee instrument as a tool for development cooperation 
since 1999, and since 2009, independent guarantees are a permanent feature of Sida’s 
instruments (Devfin Advisors, 2014). 
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well managed risk portfolio, guarantees are likely to leverage 
considerable funding at a potentially low cost. As in the case of 
Challenge Funds, these programs can be focused on sectors with a 
social benefit or constructed to serve the poor directly. Sida funded 
examples include:  
• Global Health Fund, set up by The Gates Foundation, which 
focuses on eradication of preventable diseases. Sida provides a 
first loss guarantee and subsequent risk sharing that encourages 
private firms to engage in business with a health focus, with 
strong potential commercial viability but high risk.  
• The Health Guarantee in Uganda, which is used to encourage 
local banks to lend to borrowers within the private healthcare 
value-chain. To ensure a stronger focus on less well served 
areas, 50% of the guarantee portfolio is to be directed to 
projects outside the central (wealthiest) region.  
Swedfund, playing the part of Sweden’s Development Finance 
Institution, provides support to investments with a positive 
development impact. Swedfund invests through equity, loans, and in 
locally managed equity funds with a developmental focus. Equity 
investments range between 20 and 100 Million SEK. Swedfund’s 
investments are no longer officially tied to Swedish companies. Since 
2013, Swedfund has undergone reforms aiming at a stronger mandate 
to focus on positive development impacts with a special emphasis on 
investments with beneficial environmental, social, and governance 
effects. Under Swedfund’s umbrella, but as a separate entity within the 
organization, the program Swedpartnerships offers grants for Swedish 
SMEs wishing to establish a presence in emerging markets where 
Swedfund is active. The grant, which ranges between 200,000 SEK and 
1.8 Million SEK, requires a local partner and can be used for 
knowledge transfer (e.g. training of a local agent for distribution) or 
machinery and equipment. Between 2009 and 2014, 150 such 
collaborations were approved (Swedfund.se). 
As in the case of Sida’s guarantees and loans, the development logic 
behind Swedfund’s activities is that investments that offer large social 
benefits may need public funding or shared risk taking in order to 
come to fruition or to take off in the risky environments 
characterizing many developing economies. Successful interventions 
can transfer knowledge and provide demonstration effects in 
productive and sustainable technology or business practices, as well as 
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create wage jobs. An underlying assumption is that there are strong 
indirect effects from sustainable economic growth on the poorest 
groups, i.e. those who generally lack the productive assets – skills and 
proximity to markets, among others – needed to participate in such 
investments and who mostly find themselves in the informal nonwage 
sector (World Bank, 2012b). 
Sustainable Business Activities 
Drivers–of-Change is a set of programs where Sida collaborates with 
civil society organizations that focus on influencing the private sector 
with regard to their core business undertakings, in order to strengthen 
various dimensions of CSR. More particularly, these organizations aim 
to increase sustainable business behavior, as well as strengthening 
related human rights aspects including labor rights, child rights, and 
gender equality. While the beneficiary organization can be based 
anywhere, the activities must benefit poor people in low income 
countries. In some cases, the activities include direct collaborations 
between the private sector and civil society organizations. In other 
cases, civil society organizations instead fulfill an independent 
watchdog function, identifying and bringing attention to 
unsustainable business practices.  
The development impact is expected to evolve through increased 
attention to sustainable practices in the business sector, which in turn 
will benefit workers directly, as well as local populations more 
broadly. Civil society organizations – including trade unions – often 
possess the necessary knowledge to help companies move in this 
direction.21 Contributions from the development budget are 
motivated to facilitate match-making and to provide additional 
funding for initiatives. Examples are: 
• The Child Rights and Business Program, managed by Save the 
Children, which aims to incorporate the ten child rights 
principles developed by Save the Children, UN Global 
Compact, and the UNICEF, to help businesses understand 
and improve their responsibilities vis-à-vis child rights along 
                                                                                                                                                          
21 In some cases, the partner organization may also represent another branch of the public 
sector. For example, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has managed a CSR Centre in 
Beijing for a decade. 
       
51 
the value-chains in which they operate. The program works on 
advocacy, awareness, development of standards, and strategic 
support to businesses and investors.  
• Swedwatch, a watchdog and whistleblower organization 
focusing on the activities of Swedish industry in developing 
countries and their impact on the environment and human 
rights.  
Public-private Development Partnerships, PPDPs. Sida’s PPDP’s are a 
modality for direct collaboration between Sida and private sector 
partners, in which Sida supports private sector initiated projects that 
meet Sweden’s development objectives. PPDPs encourage the private 
sector to identify and pro-actively create projects that improve 
conditions for people in poverty, by e.g. addressing environmental 
sustainability issues, or by improving general conditions in the 
business environment. Unlike the CFs, the challenge, or problem, is 
identified by the private sector partner who then proposes a solution. 
The PPDPs are considered most suitable for larger companies, and are 
currently undertaken mainly with large Swedish companies with a 
strong international presence, including retailers like H&M, Lindex, 
and KappAhl, as well as companies like Volvo, Scania, and Tetra Pak in 
the manufacturing sector. Sida’s contribution to each project accounts 
for a maximum of 50 percent of the total project cost, with the 
remainder provided by the partner company. In order to avoid direct 
company support, the projects are always expected to provide some 
public good that is not intended to benefit the partner company alone, 
and projects are always implemented by a third party (such as an 
NGO, a local government, a UN agency, etc.). Some of Sida’s PPDPs 
are intended to work specifically with increasing sustainability of 
business practices. A prominent example is: 
• The Swedish Textile Water Initiative (STWI). A pilot program 
under the STWI umbrella, the Sustainable Water Resource 
Management (SWAR) partnership, teamed up Swedish fashion 
brands KappAhl, Indiska and Lindex, their Indian suppliers, 
the Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI), Sida, and 
an India-based consultancy firm to work towards sustainable 
water management in the textile sector. Under the STWI, the 
initiative is now planned to be scaled up to include several 
Indian states, several other companies, and four other 
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countries in the world. Participating firms see increased cost 
savings as a strong benefit.  
Partnership initiatives for development 
PPDPs (Sida). Apart from supporting sustainable business activities, 
there are also PPDPs that function as joint initiatives around the 
provision of some public good. Thus, PPDPs are used to leverage 
private resources with regard to some development benefits that have 
positive effects beyond the individual partner firm, under the 
assumption that markets and local competition are not negatively 
affected by the interventions. Examples of such programs include 
ongoing PPDPs with Scania, Volvo and Tetra Pak. These programs 
seek to harness initiatives from the private sector aiming to improve 
some market or institutional failure, taking advantage of the presence 
of private enterprises on the ground and their insights into local 
business conditions and limitations, as well as their experience from 
other countries/regions. The role of ODA is to provide 
complementary funding, pooling know-how including around 
development expertise, and sharing risks. Funds are managed by an 
external non-profit implementing partner. Examples include:   
• Vocational Schools in Mechanics. Sida has established PPDPs 
with Volvo (Ethiopia, and Zambia) and Scania (Iraq) in the 
area of vocational training in mechanics. While the approach to 
the training set-up differs between schools, they are meant to 
assist local, regional and national economic development by 
removing bottlenecks in the area of basic mechanics skills, 
directly through training provided by the school, and 
indirectly, by providing an example of useful approaches to 
public-private partnerships in the vocational training sector. 
For the partner businesses, projects can build good-will as well 
as providing an increased supply of potential employees with 
adequate training.  
• Milk for Schools. Tetra Pak, the World Food Programme 
(WFP) and Sida partner around a project that provides school 
milk in Zambia’s Eastern Province. As a pilot, the project 
provides a model for delivering milk to in-school children, 
which could be scaled up nationally, improving nutritional 
status, and help small holder farmers diversify towards milk 
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production. For Tetra Pak, it offers good-will, and is expected 
to increase the demand for milk in the long run, including 
demand for packaging and distribution.  
Swedish Leadership for Sustainable Development (Sida). In addition 
to these forms of partnerships, Sida has since 2013 engaged in high 
level dialogue with a number of Swedish large multinational firms, 
through the network Swedish Leadership for Sustainable Development, 
SLSD. This initiative cuts across sustainable business activities and 
joint initiatives towards development and is based on the interchange 
of best-practice. The network counts among its members many of the 
largest Swedish multinational companies, some of which are involved 
in PPDPs. A requirement for joining is that the business model must 
include Sida’s target groups (as clients, suppliers/sub-contractors, 
etc.).22 The purpose of SLDSs is to collaborate around leadership in 
sustainable development, poverty reduction, and long term solutions 
to development challenges. The network focuses on creating decent 
jobs, combating corruption and unethical behavior, reducing negative 
impacts on environment, as well as the integration of sustainable 
development into core business models and activities. While the 
CEOs of the participating firms’ meet once a year, firms are generally 
represented by their CSR resource persons in the different working 
sessions. 
3.3 Assessing the Inventory 
How important are these flows in the aggregate volume of Swedish 
development cooperation? What countries and regions benefit most 
from these kinds of initiatives? And what kinds of development 
objectives do the different instruments correspond to? Annex 2 
provides a detailed list of the different initiatives discussed above. The 
process for data collection and estimation is summarized in Annex 3. 
Due to the lack of a single, consistent and complete source of 
information as well as a necessary assumption that multi-year 
programs commit equal amounts of funds each year throughout the 
program period, the numbers presented below should be interpreted 
as broad approximations and it is likely that they to some extent 
                                                                                                                                                          
22 Axson Johnson, Boliden, Elekta, Ericsson, Företagarna, H&M, Ica, Ikea, Indiska, 
Investor, Löfbergs, Postkodlotteriet, Ratos, Sandvik, Scania, SPP, Swedfund, Systembolaget, 
Tetra Laval, 3W (the world we want) foundation, Unilever and Volvo Trucks. 
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underestimate the total volume of ongoing collaborations. We present 
information according to forms of collaboration, regional focus, and 
links to aid objectives.  
Sida’s private sector collaborations, including Challenge Funds, 
support to sustainable business activities and PPDPs, but excluding 
guarantees, amounted to 230 million SEK in 2014. 
Swedfund received a significant amount in capital injections 
between 2010 and 2014, amounting to a total of 1.6 Billion SEK. In 
2014, the cash contribution amounted to 400 million SEK. Most of the 
substantial increase in capital initiated in 2009 and onwards was left 
unused at the onset of the period, but investment levels have since 
increased.23 
In the beginning of 2015, the value of Sida’s total guarantee portfolio 
amounted to 4.3 billion SEK (Sida Guaranteed Fact Sheet, provided by 
Sida). However, data on the guarantee portfolio are not comparable to 
the figures above for two reasons. First, these guarantees are valid over 
several years (on average 11 years). A rough annual figure would be 
obtained by dividing by 11 – arriving at just under 400 million SEK. 
More importantly though, guarantees are not a large direct cost to the 
aid budget until invoked: the ODA component includes only the 
subsidization of premiums. They largely represent a potential cost, 
which in turn is mitigated by risk management strategies. For these 
reasons, we do not add them to aggregate flows but present them 
separately. 
In view of these numbers, it seems fair to conclude that private 
sector collaborations currently account for a small share of total 
development cooperation in Sweden. In 2014, Sweden’s budget for 
development cooperation amounted to just under 30 billion SEK. Set 
against the total budget, Sida’s private sector collaborations, excluding 
guarantees, amounted to 0.8 percent of the total, and Swedfund’s 
annual capital injection to 1.3 percent. The guarantees (annualized) are 
also roughly equivalent to just over 1 percent of the development 
cooperation budget. For comparison, spending on humanitarian aid 
through Sida reached about 10 percent of Sweden’s budget for 
development cooperation; total spending on collaborations with 
                                                                                                                                                          
23 Swedish National Audit Office (2014), information provided by Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Note that it is relevant to focus on capital injections since these measure funds set 
aside for public-private sector collaborations – whether, in fact, they are used or not.   
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Swedish NGOs through Sida amounted to 6 percent of the aid 
budget.24 
How does the budget for JDI collaborations in Sweden compare to 
the situation in other donor countries? Benchmarking JDIs is not 
straightforward, given the heterogeneity among private and public 
sector collaborations in development cooperation and the difficulties 
in documenting interventions under this umbrella. That said, the 
resources allocated to JDIs by Sweden appear to be low in both 
relative and absolute terms compared to Denmark and Netherlands. 
These two countries have traditionally had a similar focus in their 
development objectives as Sweden, both in terms of countries and 
issues, but are now placing increased attention on using business as a 
channel for aid, also by combining commercial and development 
objectives. Business programs under the umbrella of Danida amounted 
to nearly 700 million SEK in 2014, which is equivalent to four percent 
of the total budget for bilateral and multilateral assistance 
(Government of Denmark, 2014; Interviews with Danida). For the 
Netherlands, it is particularly cumbersome to identify total costs, but 
in 2011, the country spent around 400 million SEK, equivalent to one 
percent of the total development cooperation budget, through the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on public-private partnerships to execute 
aid programs (IOB, 2014). Another source suggest that in 2012, aid 
resources channeled through business collaborations (which may be 
broader than JDIs) amounted to around 9 percent of total ODA, 
compared to around 20 percent through civil society associations 
(NCDO, 2013a,b). The importance of business collaborations relative 
to civil society associations increased between 2010 and 2012 and is 
likely to have increased further in recent years with a parallel process 
of reductions in the Dutch budget allocated to development 
cooperation and a policy of increasing business collaborations as a 
delivery mechanism (NCDO, 2013a,b). More generally, the US, the 
UK, the Netherlands and Germany have developed public-private 
partnerships in development cooperation since the early 2000s. Over 
the past decade, Germany initiated more than 3300 and USAID more 
than 1600 such partnerships (Devfin Advisors, 2014). 
These numbers do not include additional government funds 
managed by IFU or FMO, the Danish and Dutch equivalents of 
                                                                                                                                                          
24 Note that these 1.6 billion SEK may include some of the partnerships classified as private 
sector collaborations on CSR in our study. 
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Swedfund. For comparison, funds provided from the government for 
management by the FMO amounted to approximately 1400 million 
SEK in 2014 (FMO Annual Report, 2014). From an international 
perspective, Swedfund’s portfolio of investment is in fact relatively 
limited in size, despite the recent capital injections (Figure 3.1).  
Figure 3.1: Development Finance Institutions, by Total Investments (Year-end 
2013, in Million Euros) 
  
Source: Swedfund (2015) 
 
Innovative Investments is the single largest category of these forms of 
partnerships, value-wise, when Sida’s guarantees are excluded (Table 
3.2). Mostly, this is due to the importance of capital contributions to 
Swedfund, but also within Sida’s own portfolio, Challenge Funds are a 
dominant form of collaborations. Between 2011 and 2014, Challenge 
Funds accounted for 52 percent of Sida’s spending, while rights and 
corporate social responsibility work through Sida/NGOs and PPDPs 
accounted for 21 and 13 percent of total partnerships, respectively. 
While limited in size, these collaborations appear to have increased 
in recent years. As previously mentioned, the capital injections to 
Swedfund were significantly stepped up between 2009 and 2014 as part 
of the government’s development cooperation strategy. Focusing on 
interventions through Sida’s budget, Challenge Funds account for the 
most significant increase since 2011 – this largely reflects long term 
commitments made as of 2012 to the Africa Enterprise Challenge 
Fund (AECF), the Global Innovation Fund, and the Securing Water 
for Food Challenge Fund. Since its inception, the Public-private 
Development Partnership Program has also increased each year as 
more companies have become involved. The funds allocated to the 
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Rights/CSR group of interventions peaked in 2012-2013, at 44 million 
SEK, but were slightly lower in 2014.  
Table 3.2: Swedish Development Cooperation: Partnerships with the Private 
Sector 2011-2014, by Key Forms of Partnerships 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011-2014 2011-2014 




Innovative Investments (excl 
guarantees) 
314 488 533 540 84  
-Challenge Funds (Sida) 14 88 133 140 17 52 
-Swedfund, capital injections 300 400 400 400 68  
Sust. Business Activities 29 44 43 32 7 21 
PPDP 6 16 30 43 4 13 
Other* 16 36 37 15 5 14 
* Includes among other things Support to Chamber Trade Sweden, International 
Council of Swedish Industry, and the Private Infrastructure Development Group. 
Source: Estimates as per Annex 3.1 
 
The relative importance of projected increases beyond 2014 (shown in 
Table 3.3) needs to be interpreted with caution, as the Table only 
shows projections of annualized flows of commitments that have 
already been made. In fact, Challenge Fund commitments already 
made represent long term commitments – often over 6-7 years.  
Table 3.3: Sida, Key Forms of Partnerships 2011-2014, with Projections for 
2015-2016 (excluding guarantees). 
Million SEK 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Challenge Funds (Sida) 14 88 133 140 140 136 
Sustainable Business Activities 29 44 43 32 23 14 
PPDP 6 16 30 43 27 23 
Other 16 36 37 15 104 0 
Total 64 184 242 230 294 173 
% of Sida’s budget 0.4 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.6 0.8 
Source:  Estimates as per Annex 3. Budget data for 2015 and 2016 represent 
respectively prognosis and proposal from Sida. 
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However, it should be noted that PPDPs that have not yet been 
implemented and collaborations with NGOs that have not yet been 
renewed are not included here, which means that these items are 
underestimated in the Table. Sida’s Guarantee Scheme, finally, has also 
been expanded. While there is no available data on the development of 
the portfolio of guarantees over time, a review of the current 
commitments shows that the value and number of projects with a 
starting date in 2013 and beyond are much more significant than those 
with a starting date in 2011-2012 (Figure 3.2).  
Figure 3.2: Sida. Value of Guarantees (current portfolio) 
  
Source: Estimates based on Sida Guarantee Fact Sheet, provided by Sida. 
 
In terms of geographical distribution, the volume of support largely 
has a global reach, which makes it impossible to discern any specific 
direction of investments, although interventions and programs with a 
regional focus appear to be increasingly focused on Africa. Over 50 
percent of the value of Swedfund’s total portfolio of investment (the 
earliest project dates from 1990, but 44 percent of projects have been 
initiated after 2010) is concentrated to Africa, mostly through pan-
regional investments (Figure 3.3). However, two individual countries, 
Kenya and India, stand out, accounting for 12 and 13 percent of the 
value of investments respectively. In the past few years, in parallel with 
the reform process within Swedfund, an increasing number of projects 
have been located to Africa, partly through the investments in regional 
funds. Sida’s Guarantee Portfolio has a similar structure to 
Swedfund’s, with a strong global focus, followed by pan-African 
initiatives, and those related to individual countries (mostly in Africa).  
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Figure 3.3: Sida Guarantees, Swedfund and Swedpartnerships: Regional 
Direction. 
Swedfund, total portfolio (value of investments) 
Swedfund: Number of projects, Africa and other, by first year of 
payment, 2010-2014 
    
Sida Guarantee portfolio (value of investments): by region  
Figure 3.3 ctd. on next side  
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Figure 3.3 ctd.  
 
Swedpartnership, number of projekts approved in 2014, by 
region/country 
Source: Estimates on data provided by Swedfund, Sida Guarantee Fact Sheet, and 
Swedfund (2015) 
 
Swedpartnership’s grants, involving Swedish SMEs in joint ventures or 
other forms of collaboration with local recipient country firms, exhibit 
a higher concentration to middle income and larger markets, especially 
China and India. In 2013, China accounted for more than half of all 
projects approved in Swedpartnership. Partner countries prioritized in 
Swedish development collaboration are rarely involved.25 
Programs with a global reach also feature strongly in Sida’s 
partnerships and collaborations (see Table 3.5). More than half of total 
programmed spending is directed to global initiatives, and another 
third to Africa. Commitments to the AECF are reflected in significant 
representation of Africa in Challenge Funds, of which one window 
focuses on post-conflict countries.26 Two thirds of collaborations on 
rights/CSR are global in scope, mainly as a result of the dominance of 
large-scale programs like Business Call to Action, Child Rights and 
Business Program, Market Transformation Initiative, and the Global 
Reporting Initiative. For apparent reasons, it is more common that 
PPDPs involve specific countries. Africa remains the most important 
                                                                                                                                                          
25 Exceptions are Kenya, Mozambique, Uganda, Bosnia, Serbia, Ukraine, Bolivia and 
Colombia. 
26 AECF’s Post Conflict Window, funded by Sida, focuses on agri-businesses programs in 
Somalia, South Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
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region for interventions, and they involve several of Sida’s partner 
countries, such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia.  
Table 3.4: Sida’s Collaborations with The Private Sector: Regional Focus 
(percent of total funding per program type) 
 Challenge Funds Sustainable Business PPDP Other Total 
Global 68 69 26 84 64 
Africa 29 24 37 16 27 
 o/w Post conflict* 18 - - - 9 
Asia - - 21 - 4 
Other 3 7 16 - 5 
Source: Estimates as per Annex 3. See also Annex 2.  
 
Following the principles governing Sweden’s development policy, 
programs in the inventory are generally not formally tied to Swedish 
business, with the exception of the Swedpartnership program and a 
few other programs.27 However, it is clear that Swedish business 
nonetheless is represented in different programs, especially the PPDPs 
(Table 3.5). Information is not readily available on the HQ location 
for partners or investing firms in Swedfund’s portfolio. However, 
background research on a random sample of firms suggest that the 
prevalence of firms that have their origin in Sweden is significant, 
possibly reflecting past requirements to seek collaborations with 
Swedish firms to the extent possible that were in place earlier.  
The overall impression is that, compared to Denmark and the 
Netherlands, there is less pressure in Sweden to combine commercial 
interests with development cooperation. Unlike the situation in the 
two comparator countries, Sweden has chosen to maintain separate 
ministers for international trade and development. Public opinion in 
Denmark and Holland appears to have contributed to a stronger focus 
on involving local business and showing benefits for donor country’s 
economy. The Netherlands has chosen to focus on a few strategic 
areas close to “Dutch competence” including infrastructure sectors 
like energy and water. Compared to these countries, Sweden appears 
to allocate comparatively less resources to private sector partnerships, 
                                                                                                                                                          
27 The BiH Challenge Fund, Meeting Points Mining, and Swecare involve a direct instruction 
to work with Swedish firms, the Swedish mining sector, and the Swedish health sector 
respectively. 
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and so far also maintains a more clear division between development 
goals and business promotion.  
Table 3.5: Prevalence of Swedish companies per instrument (Sida) 
 Challenge Funds Rights/CSR PPDP Other 
Total no. of programs 9 9 13 7 
Involving predominantly firms 
with Swedish links 
1 1 11 5 
Source: Annex 2.   
 
How well do the different partnerships match Sweden’s focus areas 
for development cooperation? Partnerships with the private sector are 
focused largely on three areas: i) removing bottlenecks to growth 
(which is expected to result in poverty reduction through various 
trickle-down effects); ii) rights connected with private business 
activities in developing countries (labor, land, and gender rights), and; 
iii) sustainable environment. The focus of different programs managed 
by Sida and their match to aid policy objectives are presented in Table 
3.6. Note that the matrix is an attempt to provide a best match of 
program objectives and aid objectives, and is not an assessment of 
whether the programs de facto deliver the intended results. The table 
does not include an evaluation of Swedfund’s investments, which 
would require a detailed review of each investment project in the 
portfolio – this information is not readily available and such an 
analysis is well beyond the scope of the present study. An overview of 
the current portfolio by sector focus suggests that poverty reduction 
(through the assumed trickle-down effects from overall economic 
growth and job creation by supporting investments in industry, 
infrastructure, and energy) are the main focus areas of these 
investments.  
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Table 3.6: Partnerships and Development Objectives 
Development 
Objectives 




Focused on labor 
rights and other 





CF: Innovations for Peace 
Rights/CSR: Child Rights and 
Business Program, Swedwatch, 
HERproject, Global Reporting 
Initiative, SWHAP 











in sectors with 
relevance for 
poor and poverty 
reduction 
CF: Innovations against poverty, 
AECF, Seed Alliance, Global 
Innovation Fund, BiH Challenge 
Enterprise Fund, Powering 
Agriculture 
Rights/CSR: Business Call to 
Action 
PPDPs: A Working Future for 
Uganda, Vocational Training, 
Ethiopia, Iraq, and Zambia, Free 
milk in Zambia Schools, Small 
Scale Dairy Business in 
Bangladesh, Sustainable Design 
in Vietnam 
Market development: Loan Portfolio 
Guarantees for Economic Growth 
and Agriculture; Agriculture/Tourism 
Guarantee in  Moçambique; 
Agriculture Guarantee in Zambia; 
Agriculture Guarantee in Kenya; 
Commercial Microfinance 
Consortium; Essential Capital 
Consortium; Socremo Guarantee; 
Agriculture Guarantee in Mali; 
African Guarantee Fund 
Infrastructure: African 
Infrastructure Fund; Energy 
Platform NamPower; Angola Telecom 




CF: Innovations against poverty, 
AECF, Global Innovation Fund, 
Securing Water for Food, 
Powering Agriculture 
PPDPs: Tongol Tuna in Thailand, 
Sustainable Water Resource 
Mgmt in India, Sustainable 
design in Vietnam, Water 
Resources Group 
Wind Power in Pakistan; Global 
Guarantee Facility for Renewable 
Household Technologies; Loan 
Portfolio Guarantee for Energy 
Efficiency; Nordic Environment 
Finance Corporation Portfolio 
Guarantee 
HEALTH CF: Innovations against poverty, 
Global Innovation Fund, HER-
project, SWHAP 
PPDPs: Free milk in Zambia 
schools 
The Implant Access Program; Health 
Guarantee; Global Health 
Investment Fund 
CONFLICT   --- --- 
HUMANITARIAN   --- --- 
Source: Authors’ tabulation, based on information provided by Sida 
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Sida partnerships are also largely focused on poverty reduction and 
inclusion, some with a direct link to the poor, and others where links 
must be considered to be more indirect. The former include some of 
the Challenge Funds, such as the Innovations Against Poverty 
program that is directly focused on solving poverty-related problems. 
Among the latter are e.g. vocational schools for mechanics in heavy 
industry, which rely on a transmission of benefits from general 
economic growth to job creation and poverty reduction. As expected, 
the initiatives under “Drivers of Change” provide the closest match to 
the agenda on strengthening rights. By nature (focusing on the private 
sector, and not on institution building), these are rarely directly 
focused on democratic processes and institution building, but rather 
on civil and political rights, empowerment, right to organization, and 
pluralism in civil society. Unsurprisingly, there are no direct links to 
humanitarian assistance or conflict resolution, except in so far as some 
investments and programs are located in post-conflict countries or 
zones. 
In addition, Sida provides significant support to trade union 
development through Union to Union (collaboration through multi-
year framework agreements). This program is not included in our 
overview, since it is funded through the civil society organizations 
budget line and strategy (with its specific objectives) and thus not 
included among Sida’s business collaboration programs. The Union to 
Union Secretariat provides support with the objective of developing 
free, democratic trade unions, including through training and capacity 
building in basic trade union operations, human rights, leadership, the 
work environment, equal opportunities, the effects of globalization 
and HIV/Aids, ILO’s Decent Work Agenda. As such, it serves as a 
potential force for strengthening labor and other human rights, which 
is in accordance with the first objective of Swedish aid and with the 
same logic as “Drivers-of-Change” collaborations. 
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4 How Effectively Can Joint 
Development Initiatives Address 
Development Challenges?  
The overview of Swedish development cooperation shows that, the 
instruments available for public-private collaboration can, in principle, 
contribute to  the broad Swedish development objectives. It is possible 
to identify Challenge Funds that encourage the private sector to 
efficiently address challenges related to health and environment, and 
that promote the development of products serving the poor. Socially 
responsible business activities are at the core of labor rights, health 
and sustainability efforts working to ensure both that the increasing 
international presence in developing countries represents sustainable 
businesses, and that such practices are taken up in the business 
community at large. Public-Private Development Partnerships can 
address different constraints in new and innovative ways, drawing on 
insights and experiences from private sector actors that would not 
have been involved in development related efforts otherwise. 
Innovative finance can help spur much needed investment in neglected 
areas, and generate jobs and develop markets.  
As discussed in section 2, in spite of these potential strengths, 
public-private sector collaborations in development cooperation, are 
motivated if, and only if, they can be expected to use aid money in 
ways that ensure additionality – the positive net difference that is 
expected from a donor-business partnership as a result of the donor 
intervention (Heinrich, 2013a) – and if they can also help fulfill aid 
objectives effectively and in harmony with established principles of 
focused and effective development cooperation.  
The literature on the effectiveness of public-private partnerships, 
including JDIs, is wide, but in general neither deep nor necessarily 
conclusive, and certainly not capable of (nor necessarily seeking to) 
determining whether partnerships are a good or a bad thing. A key 
reason for the lack of in-depth evaluations is the fact that the forms of 
collaboration, while a long-standing feature of development 
cooperation, have changed and continue to change over time, and that 
many of new forms are still pilots and have not been in place for long 
enough to permit a full evaluation of impacts, effectiveness of aid 
resources, and additionality. Another and related reason is that some 
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of these programs and partnerships – especially those involving market 
development or changes in the value chain – require skills acquisition 
and changes in behavior and technology that can take long time to 
bear fruit, even in comparison with normal project-impact cycles. 
Finally, the portfolio of interventions tends to be diverse in terms of 
focus, sector, country, approaches, etc., which precludes strong 
conclusions with regard to the overall results. Much like this report, 
the literature tends not to focus on whether JDIs are “good or bad” 
but how to increase their effectiveness when they occur. Given the 
heterogeneity and dynamics of interventions, generalized conclusions 
regarding best-practice need to be interpreted with caution, and most 
overviews therefore relate to process and organization. Drawing on 
the more recent literature, which reasonably helps capture current 
developments, together with interviews with firms, some takeaways 
on the efficiency and effectiveness of Joint Development Initiatives 
include:28 
a. Results measurement remains a weakness. Little is known about 
actual results achieved by collaborations or their development 
impact; examples of replication of successful cases are still rare. 
As a result, it is difficult to assess program effectiveness. 
Important issues such as additionality of interventions, 
displacement, and deadweight losses are rarely addressed. 
Attempts to establish additionality, ex ante, or in evaluations, 
ex post, center on commercial viability or broad development 
impacts. Few assessments establish criteria for -or measure 
financial additionality, i.e. whether the private sector partner 
would have made an investment anyway. Standards have been 
developed (e.g. the Donor Committee for Enterprise 
Development, DCED standards for results measurement) 
which aim to help articulate results measurement, but these 
have yet to be widely adopted. There is also ongoing work at 
the OECD/DAC, as well as in the post-Busan P4P group. The 
development of new methods and approaches in this area 
should be followed closely.   
b. The potential and expected development impacts need to be 
clearly accounted for in preparation of projects. Partnerships 
                                                                                                                                                          
28 Reviewed studies inslude Brain et al. (2014), Kindorney and Reilly (2013), Kindorney et al. 
(2014), Forss and Schaumburg-Müller (2009), di Bella et al. (2013), Heinrich (2013, a. b), 
IOB (2013a,b, 2014), Allison (2012), USAID (2015), and interviews as per Annex 4. 
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assume, a priori, a strong role of private sector development for 
poverty reduction, and in some cases, even for conflict 
resolution and peace building. However, while there may be 
effects on technology transfer (see e.g. Blomström and Kokko, 
1997, 1998, 2002), the literature review suggests that the 
transmission to poorer groups (consumers, small holder 
producers, etc.) is not automatic. Similarly, while pilot projects 
tend to list systemic effects as an ultimate objective, it is 
difficult to measure and ascertain large scale impacts.  Business 
to business projects, in particular, may provide strong benefits 
to participating local partners, but do not necessarily translate 
into any further spillovers. Broadening the development impact 
requires dissemination, advocacy, and knowledge sharing. It 
also calls for strengthening the bargaining power and 
innovative capacity of specific groups along the value chains. 
The expected modes of reaching these groups, and the ways of 
measuring impacts need to be made explicit in the project. 
c. Cultures and knowledge differ between the world of 
development cooperation and that of private business, and it is 
important to establish trust and shared values from the outset. 
Buy-in of common objectives needs to be established not only 
between partners, but also within different hierarchies in donor 
agencies as well as in private companies (head quarters, local 
representatives/embassies).  
d. Potential win-win situations still need clear agreements from the 
outset, to make it easier to deal with uncertainties as they 
(inevitably) arise. There is a need to invest time and effort at 
the beginning of joint projects to agree on responsibilities and 
complementarities, resources, objectives, sharing of learned 
lessons, collaborations with other companies, and, importantly, 
on exit strategies.  
e. Private partnerships is merely one of several possible routes 
toward solving a development challenge or problem – other 
alternatives, with or without private sector participation or 
broader constellations, should also be evaluated to ensure the 
best value for aid money. In addition, harmonization with 
other forms of support, such as institutional capacity building 
or regulatory reform, is important.  
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The sections below discuss some of the challenges related to 
Sweden’s ongoing JDIs, with the principles of effective development 
cooperation as a backdrop. As noted earlier, it is beyond the scope of 
this study to assess the actual efficiency and effectiveness of these 
different projects. In what follows, we therefore discuss principles and 
potential areas of conflict using examples from the current Swedish 
portfolio of interventions. We group the relevant aid principles as 
follows:  
1. Targeting the most vulnerable 
2. Leveraging synergies and complementarities for development  
3. Developing, not disturbing markets 
4. Ensuring sustainability: Local ownership, harmonization and 
coordination 
5. Measuring results and fostering systemic impact 
4.1 Target groups and beneficiaries 
To what extent do JDIs reach the identified target groups for aid – 
the poorest countries, fragile and conflict ridden states, and, within 
these countries, women and girls and people living under oppression? 
Technology transfer is a leading argument behind many of the 
interventions. However, it is also clear that the ability to transmit 
sustainable practices or productivity developments through 
technology also depends on the absorptive capacities of host 
countries. In particular, ventures involving smaller companies (such as 
those engaged through Swedpartnerships) are likely to require a more 
conducive business environment in order to succeed.29 
Poor states, and especially fragile states, have by definition low 
institutional capacity and high costs for doing business due to poor 
infrastructure, corruption, as well as the lack of appropriate regulatory 
frameworks.30 Low labor productivity and weak effective demand for 
products and services (due to high poverty rates) further contribute to 
reducing the expected profitability of scalable business ventures. 
                                                                                                                                                          
29 See e.g. an evaluation of Start Syd, a predecessor to the Swedpartnerships program, by 
Andersson et al.  (2006). 
30 The World Bank’s classification of fragile states includes low institutional rankings as one 
criterion. 
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While private sector development for these very reasons is an 
important objective, the consequence for enterprise Challenge Funds 
is that there are likely to be relatively few initiatives from the private 
sector focusing on the poorest states. Collaborations that focus on 
sustainable business by and large require that businesses of significant 
size are already present in the country. PPDPs tend to focus on 
specific bottlenecks to a potential market, under the assumption that 
removing the constraint will improve business conditions.  
This notwithstanding, some projects currently do take place in low 
income countries, and the focus on poorer countries is increasing. 
Section 3 above showed that Sweden’s private sector collaborations 
largely take the form of globally directed programs. For the share that 
focuses on regional or country-specific support, many projects are 
found in low income countries in Africa, which have yet to benefit 
from significant private investment inflows. Several projects are also 
found in middle income countries like Zambia (IAP) and Kenya (IAP, 
Swedfund).  
Meanwhile, it is notable that a number of Swedish partner 
countries are apparently not involved in any JDI programs (including 
Burkina Faso, Mali, Rwanda, Zimbabwe), and another set of countries 
are only marginally involved in single programs. With the notable 
exception of the AECF window focusing on post conflict zones, the 
coverage of fragile states appears to be very low.31 For example, the 
IAP does not work in fragile states, nor are there any PPDPs present 
in such countries. Out of Swedfund’s portfolio, only four out of more 
than 60 projects are in countries defined as fragile.  
Moreover, many of the projects involving the private sector, 
especially those aiming at increasing productivity and growth in the 
local private sector or improving business conditions generally, rely on 
strong assumptions about the diffusion of economic growth to the 
intended beneficiaries, i.e. poor and vulnerable population groups. In 
principle, the very poorest groups, including children and women, can 
of course be customers and beneficiaries of innovative products and 
services. Such requirements can also be fitted into e.g. Challenge Fund 
objectives or other forms of innovative financing. As a successful 
example, the Tetra-Laval PPDP in Zambia is reaching 18,000 children 
                                                                                                                                                          
31 Sida counts nine fragile states among its partner countries: Afghanistan, DRC, Liberia, 
Mali, Myanmar, South Sudan, Sudan, WBG and Iraq. 
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in basic education in rural areas, school enrolment, as well as school 
performance, have increased in program schools, and the nutritional 
status of children has improved.32 The IAP program has, inter alia, 
provided support to projects specifically geared to improving the 
situation for women in low income families, and with caveats 
regarding the reliability of measurement, most projects have been 
making progress and expanding their reach to low income populations 
(Andersson and others, 2014). 
This notwithstanding, it has proven more difficult to involve the 
poorest groups as agents, i.e. as producers, recipients of grants, or 
primary beneficiaries of job creation, than as consumers and indirect 
beneficiaries (Sinha et al. 2013). While the IAP grantees report strong 
relevance for the poorest as clients, projects rarely include the poor as 
producers or distributors. In NIR’s Sida-supported programs in 
developing countries, the primary beneficiaries were local private 
sector partners, not poor people (Bryld et al. 2013). More generally, in 
poorer countries, the formal wage sector is small, and women in 
particular are more likely to work on the family plot or in informal 
sectors. There are still obstacles constraining women’s ability to act as 
independent entrepreneurs (Hallward-Driemeier and Hasan, 2013) 
and basic skills like literacy and numeracy are scarce among adults and 
even among youth (World Bank, 2012b).  The most vulnerable groups, 
which have limited access to CF grants, are less likely to become 
employees in the firms included in Swedfund’s investment portfolios, 
and are also less likely to be targeted by projects involving large 
multinational enterprises looking to develop local markets. Vocational 
training programs will primarily provide direct benefits to youth with 
secondary education in urban or peri-urban areas, a group that is not 
likely to include the poorest. 
Many of the ongoing initiatives in the area of improving sustainable 
business practices are directly focused on improving rights for women 
and children. For example, the Health Enables Returns (HER) project 
aims to improve reproductive health, and the Child Rights and 
Business Program is developing methods to assess and to counteract 
(both direct and indirect) negative impacts on children of various 
inappropriate business practices.33 However, there is a general scarcity 
                                                                                                                                                          
32 Impact evaluation fact sheet provided by Tetra-Laval. 
33 An evaluation of the program suggested more emphasis should be placed on reproductive 
rights to correspond to Swedish Aid Objectives (Bryld et al., 2014). 
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of evaluations (even globally) addressing impacts at the individual, or 
household, levels of these instruments (IOB, 2013b).   
Sweden’s JDIs thus have a significant focus on low income 
countries, and the concentration on low income countries has 
increased over time. Yet, successful and sustainable business ventures 
and technology spillover effects require some basic standards when it 
comes to the development of the business environment, and countries 
with very small markets or unstable conditions are not major 
recipients of these programs. The most vulnerable groups can 
potentially be reached as clients of Challenge Funds and other 
instruments and they may benefit indirectly from the development of 
sustainable business practices, but they are less likely to benefit from 
these programs as entrepreneurs or employees. Hence, expectations 
regarding the direct impact of programs on the poorest need to be 
moderate, and efforts to strengthen systemic effects and spillovers to 
increase the indirect effects need to be integrated in the projects.  
The opportunities – and interest – for JDIs are more significant in 
middle-income countries, the vast majority of which no longer qualify 
for Swedish ODA. However, many of these countries harbor large 
groups facing poverty, health and exclusion, on the one hand, and face 
significant bottlenecks to improving business conditions on the other 
hand. Swedish businesses seeking JDIs in these areas face a void. An 
international development broker facility – a form of “one-stop-shop” 
for development and business – would help guide such interests to 
appropriate partners, whether they are other donors active in the 
country, local government authorities, civil society, or other firms that 
have already established similar initiatives. 
4.2 Complementarities for Joint Development 
Initiatives 
JDIs are based on the logic of exploring synergies and 
complementarities. Companies and entrepreneurs have technical and 
managerial know-how, understand their value chain, and are the 
source of innovations and entrepreneurship. In the case of smaller 
companies, public partnerships can help alleviate financing constraints 
and share risk for innovative investments with a development benefit. 
In Denmark, participating businesses, especially smaller ones, have 
over time gained a better understanding of the importance of, and the 
       
72 
challenges involved in, development (Interview, Danida).  For larger 
companies, additional finance per se probably plays a less important 
role. Instead, donor involvement, including project funding, is 
valuable because it implies a commitment to provide development 
expertise, share reputational risk, assist in designing interventions 
building on best-practice examples from other countries, provide a 
stamp of approval in terms of development value for the interventions, 
and help to engage local government structures. In the case of 
collaborations around sustainable business practices, public funding 
helps civil society organizations use their technical competence in 
their specific area (child rights, health, environment) in collaboration 
with the private sector. A recent meta evaluation showed that donor 
contributions in this area are more effective when focusing on a 
mediating role, strengthening communication and collaboration 
between partners such as civil society, the corporate sector, and 
(other) local stakeholders, as well as when they engage in promotion 
and advocacy of corporate social responsibility principles (IOB, 
2013b). 
Tapping into innovative capacity, while balancing risk and value, is 
not a trivial endeavor. The IAP, for example, is set up to capture the 
innovative capacity of firms by alleviating their financing and technical 
constraints, in addition to providing advisory support on how to reach 
the poorest. However, innovation accounts for only 20 percent of the 
eligibility criteria, raising questions as to whether the most innovative 
and commercially viable projects are supported. Another partly 
neglected aspect of collaborations concerns capacity building for 
business development. Here, donors could potentially play an 
important complementary role with regard to raising the odds for 
projects being commercially successful (Andersson et al. 2014). The 
experience of partnerships involving smaller Swedish SMEs in 
investments in developing regions also point to the value added of 
good technical support from the perspective of firms (Kokko et al. 
2015). 
Ongoing PPDPs appear to have successfully leveraged knowledge 
from the private sector, by both identifying a development problem – 
market or institutional failure - and providing a solution. Volvo and 
Scania have worked to remove bottlenecks to skills development in 
interesting markets (Ethiopia, Zambia, Iraq) and Tetra Pak has 
developed markets and built a client base for improving nutrition 
(Zambia). Firms bring technological know-how and contribute to 
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capacity development/training. Donors, and sometimes implementing 
partners, provide critical experience of government processes, direct 
links to necessary counterparts, and help structure projects towards 
more developmental benefits, as well as providing guidance in 
monitoring and evaluation. In other words, donor participation is 
warranted for more than financing: they also contribute reputational 
risk sharing, with their convoking power to broader partnerships, and 
with knowledge of development effectiveness.  
4.3 Developing, not disturbing markets 
It is well established that aid that is tied to procurement from donor 
countries carries costs in terms of efficiency. As noted earlier, tied aid 
removes the level playing field and imposes choices and solutions that 
typically impose welfare losses on the recipient country. Tied aid is 
also the mark of supply driven development cooperation, identifying 
programs and sectors on the basis of donor country industry interests 
rather than recipient country needs. Within OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC), initiatives aiming to untie aid have 
been going on since the early 2000s. A tenant of the current study is 
that development partnerships should have one objective – 
development – and that commercial interests should be kept 
subordinate to this objective, functioning instead as a mechanism for 
engagement.  
Aid can be formally tied to Swedish firms, or informally tied so 
that non-Swedish firms in practice have little access to different 
instruments, although no official restrictions exist. According to 
DAC statistics (Table 4.1), Swedish aid became fully untied between 
2006 and 2011, but as of 2012, one percent was still formally tied.34 
Without more information, it is not possible to ascertain to what 
extent the remaining tying of aid is due to the private sector 
collaboration forms examined here.35 
The governments’ instruction to Swedfund, to seek collaboration 
with Swedish firms, while not tying aid to Swedish business interests, 
has been removed (with the exception of the Swedpartnership 
                                                                                                                                                          
34 Mainly consisting of technical cooperation (e.g. courses in Sweden for participants from 
partner countries). Information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
35 For example, collaboration with Scania and Volvo that are managed by UNIDO are 
recorded as multilateral assistance in openaid.se. 
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program). This notwithstanding, the inventory clearly showed that 
JDIs de facto involve firms with strong Swedish links, be it 
multinationals or smaller firms. However, this is the natural 
consequence of a mutual effort to seek partners with high trust and 
shared values, frequent contacts and exposure to different initiatives, 
and – in the case of Swedfund – lingering effects of earlier instructions 
to seek collaboration with Swedish firms.  
Figure 4.1: Tying Status (% untied) of Swedish Bilateral Aid and Total DAC 
Aid.  
Source: DAC Aid Statistics, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/. 
 
As programs are moving into a second phase, there are efforts to 
explore opportunities beyond Sweden. In particular, Sida’s PPDP 
program is planning to open up more partnership dialogues with non-
Swedish firms. Along the same lines, H&M, Volvo, Scania and other 
international firms are involved in PPDP-type projects with USAID 
and other donors. There does not seem to be a high risk of reducing 
aid effectiveness by tipping Swedish development cooperation towards 
sectors where Swedish business competence is considered to be strong 
(rather than to sectors where cooperation is most needed), not least 
since the resources allocated to these partnerships are limited.  
For sustainable business practices, one way forward could be to 
consider the next level of firms – those that (unlike the large 
multinational firms) do not yet have a large resources dedicated to 
CSR, or those that are less exposed to public opinion in their 
internationalization, and therefore face less external pressure to act in 
a sustainable manner. An interesting, and somewhat unexpected, 
example here is provided by the Save the Children’s activities in 
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China, where large Chinese firms active in Africa have been provided 
with training and information focusing on Child Rights and Business 
Principles.  
To what extent do projects risk turning into subsidies for 
companies, replacing interventions and activities that would have 
taken place anyway? For example, technical schools in mechanics, 
following a Scania or Volvo based curriculum, will benefit these 
companies if they can hire better trained workers, and company good-
will is likely to increase locally if projects are seen as successful. 
However, these types of projects can be designed in ways that mitigate 
the risk that they simply provide subsidies to the companies involved. 
This requires e.g. that: (i) training is kept at a general level and focuses 
on transferable rather than firm specific skills; (ii) trainees are free to 
seek employment wherever they choose and employment services can 
be included in the project to facilitate placement, and; (iii) the projects 
include broader partnerships with other firms, lowering the risk of 
firm specific advantages and improving the chances for broader sector 
wide or systemic effects. Support to initiatives that engage multiple 
firms with the aim of supporting sustainable business practices, such 
as business call to action projects, or advocacy for child rights 
programs, also serves to lower the risks of providing direct company 
subsidies. 
To some extent, most PPDPs are intended to have an impact on 
other firms. PPDPs can provide positive examples of useful 
partnerships and approaches to training, ensuring sustainable fisheries, 
or improving water management in the entire value chain, all of which 
are expected to raise industry standards through positive 
demonstration effects. These advantages can be strengthened with 
efforts to put more emphasis on collaborations and information 
sharing within and across industries.  
4.4 Sustainability: Local ownership, harmonization 
and coordination 
Local ownership is fundamental in order to ensure that projects are 
well adapted to local needs and remain viable beyond the period for 
development funding.  It is also essential for project replication and 
scale-up, which are important assumptions underlying the planned 
development benefits of many projects. Ensuring ownership among 
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local partners can be a critical issue in JDIs involving firms from 
donor countries, and especially so in the case of joint projects 
providing public goods (e.g. PPDPs) where commercial viability – 
which can be a force for project sustainability – is not necessarily 
factored in from the outset. Where initiatives are focusing on 
improving the development impact (e.g. environmental or social 
impact) of the business of (Swedish) firms, it is understandable that 
the initiative is centered in the firm. The move towards more 
programmatic, and less project oriented development cooperation – in 
combination with the emphasis on constructing and using recipient 
country competences in the process – is partly at odds with the 
proposed initiation of a project from a firm/donor alliance. Local 
ownership can also be inconsistent with companies’ desire for 
controlling the timing and development of a process where their 
business interests and/or reputation are at risk. In addition, the private 
sector is often reluctant to deal with local governments’ or indeed 
development agencies’ generally slower decision-making processes. 
Furthermore, private initiatives tend to be opportunity driven – this is, 
as explained above, one of their strengths – and will therefore occur 
mainly in countries and sectors with a strong market potential. If a 
market becomes less interesting for a particular firm, e.g. due to 
business cycles or political events, and if long term commitments have 
not been established clearly from the outset and the local ownership is 
fragile, the prospects for project sustainability are also weak.   
The risk for supply driven aid projects is significant. At the 
recipient country level, initiatives based on donor country 
competencies – such as energy, water, food security – may be part of 
the country’s development needs, but are unlikely to consistently 
match these challenges. (For example, in general, private sector 
collaboration activities appear to be virtually absent in sectors like 
basic education and social protection – which are often critical for 
long term development – however, these sectors may simply not be 
suited to these forms of partnerships). For Sweden, projects need to 
fit into country or sector strategies to motivate funding. The risk that 
recipient country ownership is weak can be mitigated, for example in 
CFs or other forms of innovative finance, in case a stronger match can 
be achieved by focusing on more development relevant sectors/areas, 
as has been done with e.g. the conflict window of AECF. Similar 
filters, in terms of countries or sectors, can also be applied to other 
forms of partnerships. Moreover, these types of initiatives highlight 
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the need for even stronger harmonization and coordination between 
donors as well as between donors and local stakeholders (government, 
NGOs, and the private sector) when identifying priority sectors, as 
well as complementarities between different donor programs.  
How can private sector initiatives translate into local ownership? 
Local ownership and the chances for systemic impact are likely to 
increase with the perceived development benefits, early consultations 
around the project design, and involvement of local partners as 
implementers. One specific challenge is to ensure that local ownership 
can be both constructed and maintained throughout a project; another 
is to devise a clear exit strategy. An evaluation of the HER project, 
focusing on information and awareness-building regarding 
reproductive competence and rights in different work places, 
suggested that in order to secure the systemic impact of the project as 
well as sustainability, more capacity building with local NGOs, and 
more engagement with national authorities and civil society would be 
required. A set-up that relies on third-party external implementers, 
which are not necessarily local (UNIDO, World Food Programme in 
the case of PPDPs) needs to explicitly consider the importance of 
anchoring initiatives locally throughout and beyond project duration.  
In addition ownership needs to be ensured within firms. A lesson 
from existing and attempted Swedish JDIs is a need for appreciation 
of the value of the intervention, primarily good-will, to the firm.36 
Local representatives, market directors, as well as general management 
all need to be on board.37 
The mechanics schools in Iraq and Ethiopia also illustrate that both 
systemic effects and sustainability (other firms joining a project, or 
imitating it) would be much increased if the projects had been based 
on building partnership among several firms from the outset (the 
Coffee Climate Initiative and up-scaling of the Swedish Textile Water 
Initiative project are two examples of such inclusive processes, where 
several firms have been involved from the outset). However, there can 
be reluctance, especially among large multinational firms, to engage 
with other firms that could potentially serve as competitors in the 
target markets.   
                                                                                                                                                          
36 For example, the Child Rights and Business Program and a postponed PPDP for a 
technical school in Tanzania. 
37 One NGO representative working on sustainable business practices commented that “I 
don’t come to the meeting if only CSR people are present”. 
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In sum, while it is necessary to allow initiatives to arise from the 
private business sector – which is an important logic behind their 
involvement as partners in the first place – local ownership, project 
sustainability, and systemic effects are at risk, as is the case in all 
donor driven aid. Mitigating strategies would include a clarification, up 
front, local engagement points, on how partnerships will be broadened 
and inclusive in the projects, and how they fit within the broader 
development priorities of the aid recipient country. Prior agreements 
need to be made as to the how – as well as the where – results and 
lessons learned should be disseminated.   
4.5 Measuring results and fostering systemic impact 
JDIs, especially Challenge Funds and PPDPs, have generally taken the 
form of pilots: projects that, in principle, can be scaled up or 
replicated once proven effective. Pilot projects are now a mainstream 
approach to testing new programs in development cooperation (Box 
4.1), and form an integral part of the increased emphasis on evidence-
based aid. Pilot programs, however, are not merely small programs: 
the purpose is to provide systematic evidence on effectiveness in order 
to support or refute a specific model for replication or scale-up.  
Box 4.1: Pilot Projects and Development Programs 
A pilot project is (i) Innovative, testing a new, promising approach; (ii) Replicable 
- the program can be scaled up or can be applied in a different setting; (iii) 
Strategically relevant; (iv) Influential for policy decisions, and: (v) Previously 
untested. 
A pilot is thus a small scale program that can provide a rigorous, fast and relatively 
inexpensive testing ground for larger scale interventions. Because of the emphasis 
on evaluations, a pilot is generally expensive on a per-beneficiary basis. Without 
careful planning, implementation and follow-up, pilots are likely to fail, in that 
they may not be able to provide sufficient grounds for judging effectiveness. A 
pilot that shows program failure is not automatically a failure: instead, a pilot 
failure occurs when the program evaluation cannot provide answers to the 
question it had intended to address, wasting resources instead of supporting 
judicious use of development funds. 
Source. Gertler et al., 2011.   
 
As discussed, many activities presume developmental effects through 
spillovers and transmission of good practices along value chains. This 
raises questions at two levels. First, are programs set up to in order to 
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be able to provide clear lessons for the relevant industry, other 
stakeholders, and for the donor and business community at large? 
Second, are programs likely to lead to replication or scale-up?  
Some programs lend themselves to rigorous impact evaluations – 
Tetra Pak’s Milk for Schools-project is one such example. This project 
shows clear and verifiable results in terms of nutrition and school 
attendance, but also replication in the form of government programs 
based on the same model (Tetra Pak evaluation fact sheet). Other 
programs are not necessarily suitable for such statistical methods. 
Instead, the PPDP proposals discussed earlier (Volvo in Ethiopia/ 
Zambia; Scania in Iraq) include a logical framework with indicators of 
expected program objectives and outcomes, as well as established 
processes for monitoring and evaluation. Most indicators are relevant 
and attributable to projects. Still, more frequent recourse to 
established standards on results measurements, such as the DCED 
standards, would most likely help establish project impact and aid in 
the articulation of expected changes and key assumptions from the 
outset. Box 4.2 summarizes the DCED standards for results 
measurement. 
Box 4.2: The Donor Committee for Enterprise Development: Standards for 
Results Measurements 
1. Articulating the Results Chain or program logic  
2. Defining indicators of change based on the logic  
3. Measuring changes in indicators, applying good practice  
4. Estimating attributable changes  
5. Capturing wider changes in the system or market  
6. Tracking associated program costs  
7. Reporting results in a responsible way  
8. Managing the system for results measurement 
Source: Donor Committee on Enterprise Development 
 
Nonetheless, more emphasis will be needed on dissemination and 
replication of pilots. For example, the cost-per-beneficiary of a multi-
year training program in mechanics is high, compared to other forms 
of interventions. Strong systemic effects would better motivate 
funding of these projects. As previously pointed out, successful 
scaling up requires the engagement of other firms, local NGOs, 
and/or local authorities from the outset, whether in Challenge Funds, 
PPDPs, or collaborations around sustainable business practices. Many 
of the grantees in the IAP report difficulties when efforts are made to 
       
80 
move beyond the pilot stage (Andersson et al., 2014). An action plan 
with steps to ensure that projects are well anchored and that lessons 
learned are disseminated, locally (as well as at an international level if 
relevant), should be part of the project set-up. Again, this may be an 
area of tension between business objectives and priorities on the one 
hand, and development objectives on the other hand, and should be 
carefully clarified from the outset of the program planning process.  
Platforms for exchange of knowledge between projects carried out 
by the same donor, and between donors, will also be needed. At the 
moment, the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED) 
serves the purpose of being one such “hub” for the exchange of 
lessons learned. In addition, Sida has co-financed the Learning, 
Knowledge and Development Facility (LKDF) managed by UNIDO, 
which works to collect and manage information regarding PPDPs in 
vocational training programs financed by USAID and Sida. These 
platforms have the potential to coordinate stock taking across both 
donors and firms. Sida is planning to collaborate with Volvo around 
several training centers in Africa. When projects become streamlined 
in this way, there are considerable opportunities for cross-project 
learning. More streamlined approaches may also help in engaging local 
partners as formal project managers, while establishing a hands-on 
support/mentoring function in the knowledge platform. Nonetheless, 
coordination mechanisms around knowledge management and 
dissemination, especially with respect to project outcomes and 
sustainability, appear relatively weak so far.  
Aid effectiveness also relies on accountability and transparency 
with regard to the size and use of resources. Whereas Swedfund has 
previously not divulged details on investment volumes in individual 
firms, the most recent annual report (for the fiscal year 2014) contains 
this information, in accordance with the changing reporting principles 
laid out in the Owner’s Instructions. However, as discussed in annex 
3, information on different forms of partnerships such as collaborating 
firms and total commitments, whether for Sida or Swedfund, is not 
readily available in a transparent manner through openaid.se. This is 
probably the result of weaknesses in information management more 
than anything else. Nevertheless, transparency remains a key principle 
for building confidence in development effectiveness and should be 
respected in each of these partnerships. 
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5 Conclusions and 
Recommendations: The Nature 
of the Win-Win 
Our overview has shown that there is growing attention in the 
development community regarding the potential for leveraging private 
sector contributions for development. The increasing interest is driven 
by a global acknowledgement of the need to seek out new and broader 
partnerships to further development, the fact that private businesses 
account for a major share of resource flows into developing countries, 
as well as a growing focus on sustainable business practices and social 
entrepreneurship in the business community. The report has identified 
both good reasons for the donor community to collaborate with 
private firms and positive examples of such collaborations. At the 
same time, we have also stressed that expectations need to be realistic 
as to when and where they will work best.  
There is a significant, albeit small role for aid in supporting the 
involvement of the private sector in improving the development 
impact of private business activities. Aid donors can support the 
development of more sustainable business practices, and strengthen 
the rights of other stakeholders in their relations with the business 
community. The donors’ contributions can also go beyond financing. 
They can complement the private sector with development expertise, 
entry points to national and local authorities, harmonization with 
other donors/projects, and knowledge management around 
effectiveness regarding the design, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation, replication, as well as scaling up of projects. Among 
bilateral donors there is a growing trend to seek out collaborations 
with the private sector in the form of various Joint Development 
Initiatives, although the objectives and approaches vis-à-vis 
development and business differ significantly across countries.   
This report has aimed to map out the landscape of activities in 
Swedish development cooperation in this area. However, presenting a 
detailed and comprehensive picture of Swedish JDIs proved to be 
difficult, mainly because data on these types of collaborations are not 
readily available. The lack of published information may be 
understandable, given the broad scope of initiatives together with the 
demand-driven and innovative nature of the programs. Nevertheless, 
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transparency is an important objective of aid effectiveness, and a first 
recommendation is that efforts aiming towards better comprehensive 
and consistent reporting of the programs are needed. This does not 
only refer to quantitative information on total expenditure, or 
evaluations of the development effects of projects. To motivate 
increases in public funding, more work is also needed regarding the 
management of JDIs, e.g. on how to strengthen preparation of 
interventions, how systemic effects can be promoted, how 
sustainability can be ensured, and how replication and up-scaling can 
be achieved once pilots have proved to be successful. Rather than 
spreading limited budgetary resources over many programs, focus 
should be on monitoring and evaluating pilot experiences and sharing 
these results widely. 
Our overview, which includes many caveats on data accuracy, 
suggests that a comparatively small share (just over two percent, 
excluding guarantees) of Sweden’s development cooperation is 
currently focused on Joint Development Initiatives. Most of these two 
percent reflect a (temporary) increase in funds available for Sweden’s 
development finance institution, Swedfund. Programs managed by 
Sida account for less than one percent of the total aid budget. Some of 
these limited funds are directed through civil society organizations 
working with responsible business practices. These numbers are low 
compared to levels in Denmark and the Netherlands, countries which 
historically have tended to focus on similar countries and issues as 
Sweden, but whose strategies to increase ties to national businesses in 
the development agenda are more explicit. The relatively small share of 
Swedish aid directed to JDIs (so far) is explained by several factors: (i) 
The programs are recent and under development; (ii) The initiative in 
several cases comes from the private sector, which sets the volume and 
pace of expansion; (iii) Programs leverage additional funding from the 
private sector, and; (iv) Programs have limited applicability in many 
key sectors and – in the case of Sweden – should fit into the strategies 
set for different development partnerships at country, sector or 
regional level. 
Most of the funds allocated to JDIs are directed to global funds, 
followed by partnerships with a focus on Africa. Overall, there is an 
increasing concentration on bringing these initiatives to low income 
countries, and (through a specific challenge fund window) to post-
conflict countries, where they may have more significant additional 
effects. Currently, partnerships are focused largely on three broad 
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development objectives: i) removing bottlenecks to growth (which is 
expected to result in poverty reduction through trickle-down effects); 
ii) rights connected with private business activities in developing 
countries (labor, land, and gender rights), and; iii) sustainable 
environment.  
Swedish aid does not seem to lean strongly towards increased 
informal tying by concentrating on Swedish business areas of 
competence. This is a good thing: the costs of tying aid, formally or 
informally, are well documented and should be avoided. At the same 
time, it is to be expected that public-private partnerships will tend to 
have a bias towards home-country firms. When more and more donors 
are introducing similar partnership mechanisms, it is natural that 
donors will primarily collaborate with their home country firms that 
are networked not only with the donor organization, but also with 
other public sector institutions and civil society organizations in the 
home country. 
The lack of comprehensive evidence on the performance of JDIs 
reflects changing approaches over time – including the introduction of 
new programs, such as PPDPS, and a reform to Swedfund’s 
instructions – and the fact that most initiatives are relatively recent – 
effects are expected to be visible only over the long term (systemic 
effects, scalable effects, value chain effects, and so on). It is therefore 
premature to undertake full assessments of the external validity of 
programs. A second recommendation is that the pace of expansion of 
the new forms public-private partnership forms should be relatively 
cautious until more comprehensive evidence on effects and results are 
available – the step-by-step approach that is already implemented is 
warranted at this stage.  
However, although program effectiveness (with a few exceptions) 
cannot be ascertained yet, it is possible to evaluate the applicability of 
instruments against Sweden’s aid objectives and against broadly 
accepted principles of delivering effective aid, through locally owned, 
transparent, untied, and results driven approaches.   
The instruments used in Sweden – innovative finance, challenge 
funds, collaboration around public goods or strengthening of 
sustainable practices – can certainly be tailored to work towards aid 
objectives. However, they work less well in some development areas, 
and many of them rely on strong assumptions of market-wide 
spillovers and trickle-down effects from private sector development to 
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poverty reduction. The present programs will, in general, not reach the 
most vulnerable and are not likely to benefit the poorest groups 
directly. Several areas for development that are obviously important – 
in general and as complements to objectives related to a favorable 
business environment –are not well addressed with the existing 
instruments, for example basic education, institution building, and 
public financial management. The solution must not necessarily be to 
seek public-private instruments that address these questions, but 
rather to be realistic about when and where the existing instruments 
are likely to effectively address development constraints. Hence, our 
third recommendation is that JDIs should not primarily be seen as a 
substitute for more traditional aid instruments, but rather as a 
complement. 
Given the size of private financial flows directed toward developing 
countries, efforts focusing on sustainable business practices and 
improving the quality of private investment (increasing environmental 
awareness and technology transfer, resource management, labor rights, 
and health initiatives within firms) have great potential for 
development and a wide constituency of beneficiaries. This leads to 
our fourth recommendation: we see particularly strong reasons to 
support civil society collaborations, with civil society organizations 
carrying out their watchdog and advocacy functions and acting as 
experts in collaborations with firms.  
The majority of private firms involved in Sweden’s existing JDIs 
are large multinationals from Western countries. Although their 
collaboration with donors and civil society organizations can be 
expected to add value, it is also clear that this group of firms has 
strong motives and substantial own capacity to engage in CSR 
activities that promote development. Our fifth recommendation is 
therefore to reach beyond the largest Swedish multinationals in the 
design of future partnership programs. These efforts may include 
funding programs that reach out to other multinationals, including 
firms from BRIC countries. They could also include programs aiming 
to engage medium and large firms in Sweden, which are present in 
developing countries but lack the internal CSR capacity needed in 
order to identify the way forward in terms of sustainable business 
practices. 
Finally, the opportunities – and interest – for JDIs are likely to be 
significant in countries that have graduated from the Swedish ODA 
portfolio, but where many development challenges remain to be 
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tackled. Swedish businesses seeking JDIs in these areas have few 
opportunities to engage with Swedish ODA community. It is 
premature to recommend that the group of Sweden’s partner 
countries should be extended to middle-income countries to 
accommodate more JDIs. However, we recommend that an informal 
development broker facility be established in selected Swedish 
embassies in countries that have graduated from Swedish aid 




Adam Smith International. 2009.  “Support to ‘Business for 
Development (B4D)’: A Review of new Approaches and donor 
agency experiences”.  
Allison. 2012. Driving Inclusive Economic Growth: The role of the 
Private Sector in International Development, Report of the Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, 
Canada House of Commons. 
Andersson, Angestav, La Corte och Grettve. 2006.   Start East and 
Start South Programmes. Sida Evaluation 06:15. Sida, Department 
for Infrastructure and Economic Cooperation.  
Andersson, Norén and Christoplos. 2014. Evaluation of the Challenge 
Fund Innovations Against Poverty, IAP. Sida Decentralized 
Evaluation, 2014:40, Sida.  
Andrés, Gausch, Haven and Foster. 2008. The Impact of Private Sector 
Participation in Infrastructure: Lights Shadows and the Road Ahead. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.  
Billing, Forslind and Metell-Cueva. 2012. “The role of business in 
poverty alleviation and the role of donors in promoting private 
sector contributions to development”, Perspectives no. 22, School 
of Global Studies, Gothenburg University.  
Blomström and Kokko. (1997). How Foreign Investment Affects 
Host Countries. Policy Research Working Paper No. 1745, The 
World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
       
86 
Blomström and Kokko. (1998). Multinational Corporations and 
Spillovers. Journal of Economic Surveys 12(3). 
Blomström and Kokko. (2002). FDI and Human Capital: A Research 
Agenda. OECD Development Centre Technical Papers No. 195, 
OECD, Paris.  
Brain, Gulrajani and Mitchell. 2014. Meeting the challenge: How can 
enterprise challenge funds be made to work better? EPS Topic Guide 
for DFID.   
Bryld, Modeer, Masri-Pedersen, and Frpslev Christensen. 2013. 
Evaluation of Sida & NIR Core Support Programme (2009-2012). 
Sida Decentralized Evaluation, 2013:23, Sida.  
Bryld, Coulter, Kamau and Patwary. 2014. Evaluation of HERproject. 
Sida Decentralized Evaluation, 2014:41, Sida.   
Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation  (2011), 
Communication from the fourth high level forum on aid effectiveness, 
Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 November – 1 December 2011.   
Byiers and Rosengren. 2012. Common or Conflicting Interests? 
Reflections on the Private Sector (for) Development Agenda. 
European Centre for Development Policy Management.  
Clay, Geddes Natali and te Velde. 2008. Thematic Study: The 
Developmental Effectiveness of Untied Aid: Evaluation of the 
Implementation of the Paris Declaration and of the 2001 DAC 
Recommendation on Untying ODA to the LDCs, Phase 1 Report. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark.  
Dahnsdotter, and Ewald. 2014. Det civila samhället och 
internationellt utvecklingssamarbete. Myndigheten för ungdoms- 
och civilsamhällesfrågor. Stockholm. 
Danish Government. 2014. Priorities for Danish Development 
Cooperation 2015: Overview of the development cooperation budget 
2015-2018.  
Devfin Advisors. 2014. Innovative Finance: Gap Analysis. Report to 
Sida, May 2014.  
Di Bella, Grant, Kindorney and Tissot. 2013. Mapping Private Sector 
Engagements in Development Cooperation. North-South Institute 
Research Report. January 2014.  
       
87 
Dorsey. 2008. “A Capital Story”. Finance and Development. 45(2). 
Forss and Schaumburg-Müller. 2009. Synthesis of Evaluations on 
Support to Business Development. DANIDA Evaluation 2009:5. 
Danida Evaluation Dpt, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark.  
Gertler, Martinez, Premand, Rawlings and Vermeersch. 2011. Impact 
Evaluation in Practice. Washington, DC: The World Bank.  
Graeme, Greve and Boardman, editors. 2010. International Handbook 
on Public-Private Partnerships. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.  
Hallward-Driemeier and Hasan. 2013. Empowering Women: Legal 
Rights and Economic Opportunities in Africa. Africa Development 
Forum series. Washington, DC: World Bank.   
Heinrich. 2013, a. “Demonstrating Additionality in Private Sector 
Development Initiatives: A Practical Exploration of Good Practice 
for Challenge Funds and other Cost Sharing Mechanisms”.  
DCED Donor Committee for Enterprise Development Working 
Paper, March 2013.  
Heinrich. 2013, b. “Donor Partnerships with Business for Private 
Sector Development: What can we Learn from Experience”, Donor 
Committee for Enterprise Development WP, March 2013.   
IOB. 2014. In search of focus and effectiveness: Policy review of Dutch 
support for private sector development 2005-2012. IOB Study 389.  
IOB. 2013a. Public-Private Partnerships in developing countries. A 
systematic Literature Review. IOB Study 378.  
IOB. 2013b. Corporate Social Responsibility: the role of public policy. A 
systematic Literature review. IOB Study 377.  
Kindorney, Tissot and Sceiban. 2014. The Value of Cross-Development 
Partnerships. North-South Institute Research Report. Jan. 2014.  
Kindorney and Reilly, 2013. Promotion and Partnership: Bilateral 
Donor Approaches to the Private Sector. In: ÖFSE (Hg.) 
Österreichische Entwicklungspolitik, Analysen.  
Kokko, Johansson de Silva and Norberg. 2015. Nya svenska exportörer 
i Asien år 2013 Vilken roll har exportfrämjandet spelat?  Swedish 
Agency for Growth Policy Analysis, Report 2015:04.   
       
88 
Kwakkenbos. 2012. Private Profit for Public Good? Can Investing in 
Private Companies Deliver for the Poor? European Network on 
Debt and Development.  
Lindahl.2009. Business For Development. En kartläggning av svenskt 
B4D och några tankar kring ett metaprogram.  
Lindenberg, M. and K. Bryant. 2001. Going Global. Transforming 
Relief and Development NGOs. Bloomfield, CT; Kumarian Press. 
Narula and Dunning. 2010. “Multinational Enterprises, Development, 
and Globalisation: Some Clarifications and A Research Agenda.” 
Oxford Development Studies 38(3): 263-287.  
NCDO. 2013 a. Uitgaven en bezuinigingen 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Spending Cuts and Development). 
Fact Sheet, June 2012. 
NCDO. 2013 b. The Dutch and Development. Ahead of the crowd or 
trailing behind? Report, March 2013.  
ODI. 2013. Understanding Challenge Funds. Report, October 2013.  
OECD. 2014. Making Development Cooperation More Effective. 2014 
progress report. OECD Publishing.  
OECD. 2009. Sweden: Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
Peer Review. OECD Publishing. 
OECD. 2007. OECD Principles for Private Sector Participation in 
Infrastructure. OECD Publishing.  
Resare. 2014. Näringslivet och biståndet: En uppföljande kartläggning 
om öppenhet, utvärderingar och bundenhet i svenskt bistånd 2011-
2014. Svenska Kyrkan och Diakonia.  
Resare. 2011. Det privata näringslivet som förmedlare av svenskt 
bistånd – en kartläggning. Svenska kyrkan och Diakonia. 
Sida. 2003. Challenges to Sida’s Support to Private Sector Development: 
Making Markets Work for the Poor.  
Sida. 2014. Sida’s Proposal for the State Budget, 2015-2017 
Siméant, J. 2005. “What is Going Global? The Internationalization of 
French NGOs ‘Without Borders’”. Review of International 
Political Economy. 12:5, 851-883. 
       
89 
Sinha, Holmberg and Thomas. 2013. What works for market develop-
ment: A review of the evidence. UTV Working Paper 2013:1, Sida 
Strange, Parks, Tierney, Fuchs, Dreher and Ramachandran. 2013. 
China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to 
Data Collection. Center for Global Development, Working Paper 
323, April 2013 
Swedfund. 2010-2015. Annual Reports.  
Swedish Government. 2014. Aid Policy Framework. Government 
Communication 2013/14:131.   
Swedish Government. 2013. Riktlinjer för resultatstrategier inom 
Sveriges internationella bistånd. Annex, Government Decision 
2013-07-11.  
Swedish Government. 2009-2014. Budget Bills. 
Swedish Government. 2003. Gemensamt Ansvar: Sveriges Politik för 
Global Utveckling. Government Proposal 2002/03: 122.  
Swedish Government. 1962. Government Bill 1962:100. 
Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU). 2006. Att ta itu med 
fattigdomen - krediter och garantiers nya roll. SOU 2006:108. 
Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU). 1972. Industriutveckling och 
utvecklingssamarbete. SOU 1972:90. 
Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU). 1962. Aspekter på 
utvecklingsbiståndet. SOU 1962:12. 
Swedish National Audit Office. 2014. Swedfund International AB: Är 
finansieringen av bolaget effektiv för staten? Report 2014:6.  
World Bank. 2012 a. Public Private Partnerships Reference Guide. . 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
World Bank. 2012b. World Development Report 2013: Jobs. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.  
World Bank. 2013. Financing for Development, Post 2015. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.  
USAID. 2015. PPP in Global Value Chains: Can they actually benefit 
the Poor? Leo Report 2015:8. February, 2015.    
 90 
Annex 1. Objectives and Principles of Aid: Overview Tables 
Table A1: Objectives, Potential Contribution of The Private sector, And Value-Added from Involving ODA Agencies 
Objectives of (Sweden’s) aid policy and areas of action Where can private sector contribute 
through improved business practices 
and new solutions to development 
problems?  
Are there opportunities for donor 
partnerships?  
1. RIGHTS: Strengthened democracy and gender equality, greater respect for 
human rights and freedom from oppression 
• Greater opportunities to assert civil and political rights, exercise 
democratic influence and organise  
• More robust democratic processes and institutions and greater respect for 
the principles of the rule of law  
• A vibrant and pluralistic civil society and strengthened democratisation 
actors  
• Greater gender equality, rights and empowerment for women and girls  
• Greater access to free and independent media, both new and traditional 
• “Race to the top” in good business 
practices, e.g.:  
Improved labor rights in respective 
industries 
Work on gender equality in access, pay 
and conditions 
Anti-corruption 
Access to ICT as a tool for democracy 
development 
• Facilitator and matchmaker: 
Support to dialogue and sharing 
of best-practice 
• Support to civil society re. 
sustainable business 
• Risk sharing (finance, reputation) 
• Strong fiduciary systems  
• Support access to ICT 
2. POVERTY REDUCTION AND INCLUSION:  Better opportunities for people 
living in poverty to contribute to and benefit from economic growth and obtain 
a good education  
• Improved access to good quality education  
• More and better jobs  
• More inclusive and efficient markets  
• More liberalised trade  
• Inclusive economic growth and job 
creation 
• Skills and technology transfer 
• Improved working conditions 
• Innovative products and services 
reaching the poor 
• Research and development /innovation 
• Facilitator, matchmaker 
• Risk sharing (finance, reputation) 
in priority sectors, countries, 
groups.  
• Partnering with private sector to 
solve specific development 
challenges  
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• Improved food security  
• High-quality research relevant to the fight against poverty 
• Improved access to social protection 
• Improved access to open and secure ICT  
• Greater capacity to tackle the opportunities and challenges brought about 
by migration and mobility  
• Access to ICT   
• Capacity building to public and private 
institutions through private sector 
 
3. ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY: A better environment, limited climate 
impact and greater resilience to environmental impact, climate change and 
natural disasters  
• Greater resilience to environmental impact, climate change and natural 
disasters, and a reduced environment and climate impact  
• Strengthened institutional capacity in environmental management and 
environmental institutions  
• Sustainable cities 
• Improved access to sustainable energy sources 
• Sustainable management of ecosystems and sustainable use of ecosystem 
services  
• Transfer of sustainable practices 
• Investment in sustainable business 
• Capacity building to public and private 
institutions through private sector 
• Facilitator 
• Risk sharing (finance, reputation) 
in priority sectors, countries, 
groups 
• Support to civil society  
4. HEALTH:  Improved basic health  
• Improved access to sexual and reproductive health and rights and reduced 
vulnerability to HIV and AIDS  
• Improved survival and healthier lives primarily for women and children  
• Improved access to clean water and basic sanitation  
• Innovation, research and development 
• Sustainable business practices 
• Risk sharing (finance, reputation) 
in priority sectors, countries, 
groups.  
• Partnering with private sector to 
solve specific development 
challenges  
• Support to civil society, e.g. 
Health initiatives as labor rights 
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5. CONFLICT:  Safeguarding human security and freedom from violence 
• Reduced vulnerability to conflict and lapsing back into conflict  
• Greater human security in conflict and post-conflict situations  
• Inclusive economic growth 
• Sustainable business practices 
• Risk sharing (finance, reputation) 
in post-conflict countries 
6. HUMANITARIAN:  Saving lives, alleviating suffering and maintaining human 
dignity 
• Humanitarian aid based on humanitarian needs, including the special 
needs of women and children  
• Improved food security in conjunction with humanitarian crises and 
disasters  
• Effective protection of refugees and internally displaced persons  
• Greater respect for humanitarian principles and international 
humanitarian law  
• A strong and coordinated international humanitarian system 
• Innovation in delivery mechanisms 
of food aid, IDPs , etc.  
• Risk sharing (finance, 
reputation) 
Source: Columns 1: Swedish Aid Policy Framework (Government, 2014). Columns 2 and 3: authors’ interpretations, interviews.  
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Table A2: Principles of Effective Aid and Collaboration with The Private Sector  
Principles of Swedish aid  Collaboration with private sector 
 Opportunities  Risks 
The most important target 
groups for Swedish aid: women 
and girls in poor countries and 
people in different places who 
live under oppression. 
Collaboration and 




This is not where private 
investment is focusing 
The poorest  lack assets to 
participate in markets 
Ownership of development 
priorities by developing 
counties: Countries should 
define the development model 
that they want to implement.  
Private firms have a 
complementary view 
of what is needed on 
the ground  
Initiative from donor country, 
less focus on 
country/regional/thematic 
strategies, especially in 
focusing on sectors/areas whith 
a comparative advantage 
Harmonization, coordination 
and predictability in aid 
Coordination between 
private and public 
sector in global policy 
Conflict between innovation and 
flexibility, vs. predictability 
Donor country driven 
A focus on results: Having a 
sustainable impact should be 
the driving force behind 
investments and efforts in 
development policy making  
Results driven culture Limited access to project 
process, different views on 
“results”, time lag, monitoring 
and evaluation.  
Reputational risk and 
resistance to dissemination  
Transparency and shared 
responsibility: Development 
cooperation must be 
transparent and accountable to 
all citizens 
 Private business investment 
information 
Innovation and flexibility Private business 
sector is a key force 
for innovation;  
 
Partnerships for development: 
Development depends on the 
participation of all actors, and 
recognizes the diversity and 




donor can contribute 
with knowledge about 
development or 
efficient programs 
Donor coordination around 
target areas 
Collaboration with other actors 
Fight against corruption Good business 
practices transmitted  
Poor practices 
Untied aid (value for money) 
and effects on local competition 
(disturbing markets) 
 Risks (for some forms of 
partnerships): de facto tied aid 
and company subsidies 
Source: Columns 1: Swedish Aid Policy Framework (Government, 2014). Columns 
2 and 3: authors’ interpretations, interviews.  
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Annex 2. Sida Programs: Joint 
Development Initiatives.  
Challenge Funds  
Innovations Against Poverty  Sida 
AFRICA Enterprise Challenge Fund   Multi-donor 
SEED Alliance  Multi-donor 
Global Innovation Fund USAID, DFID 
Securing Water for Food USAID, MFA-NL 
Bosnia Herzegovina Challenge Enterprise Fund   
Innovations for peace GIZ 
Powering Agriculture USAID 
Making all voices count USAID and others 
Sustainable Business Practices (CSR, Drivers of 
Change) 
  
Business Call to Action Business Call to Action, H&M, 
Ericsson 
Child rights and business program Save the Children, Sweden 
Swedwatch Swedwatch 
Health Enables Returns (HER) project Business for Social Responsibility, 
H&M, Lindex 
Outreach Accelerator Programme  Social Entrepreneurship Forum 
Global Reporting Initiative  Global Reporting Initiative  
Swedish HIV and Aids Workplace Programme 
(SWHAP) 
NIR, IF Metall, Scania, Sida 
Market Transformation Initiative WWF 
Study: Instrument to assist business in conflict and 
post conflict zones 
Diakonia 
Private Public Development Partnerships   
A working future Uganda Accenture, Plan Sweden 
Coffee and Climate Initiative Lofbergs Lila, GIZ, etc.  
Vocational training, Iraq Scania, MOLSA , UNIDO 
Vocational training, Ethiopia Volvo, UNIDO, Selam Technical 
Academy 
Tongol Tuna, Sustainable fishery in Thailand Abba Seafood, Sustainable Fisheries 
Partnership 
Free milk in Zambian schools Tetra Pak, WFP, PROFIT, Government 
of Zambia 
Small scale dairy business in Bangladesh Tetra Pak, PRAN, UNIDO 
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Swedish Textile Water Initiative Indiska, Lindex, Kappahl, SWRI 
PPDP Civil Registration Nampula Green Resources, UNICEF 
Vocational Training, Zambia  Volvo, Salem School, UNIDO 
Water Resources Group IFC, Coca Cola, Pepsico och Nestlé 
B4D PPP Vietnam Design United, UMA.  
Vocational Training,  textile sector, Bangladesh H&M, ILO, IF Metall 
Industrial relations and rights, garment sector, 
Cambodia 
H&M, ILO, IF Metall 
Business in development hub facility   
Learning, knowledge, development facility 
(knowledge management) 
UNIDO 
Other   
Chamber Trade Sweden Chamber Trade Sweden 
NIR NIR 
Demo Miljö Tillväxtverket 
PIDG (Private Infrastructure Development Group) PIDG Trust  
Land related investments  
Meeting Points Mining SGU 
Network Health Swecare Foundation 
Source: Elaborated based on a mapping exercise by Lisa Román, Resare (2011, 
2014), Openaid.se, and input from Sida’s Department for Partnerships and 
Innovation.   
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Annex 3. Inventory of Joint 
Development Initiatives: Collecting 
Data  
Consolidated data for private sector collaborations are not readily 
available from one coherent source, such as an annual report, a budget 
proposal, or an online information system, but have to be collated and 
estimated from a variety of sources. The problem of identifying, 
classifying and evaluating program commitments and disbursements 
appears to apply to development cooperation programs overall and is 
not unique to Joint Development Initiatives. However, research in 
this area is complicated by the fact that although these programs are 
presented under one umbrella title, systematically grouped 
information is not available within Sida, partly reflecting the facts that 
many interventions are pilots, that programs have sequentially been 
incorporated under this heading, and that there is no longer a specific 
strategy or budget governing these instruments – they have to fit into 
country/sector/regional strategies.  
The data used in the report were arrived at as follows:  
• The focus is on commitments and not actual disbursements, 
because of a lack of a consistent and complete data on 
disbursements.  
• Overview data for Sida guarantees were provided in a fact 
sheet by Sida’s Loan and Guarantee unit on request, and 
overview data for Swedfund’s portfolio were provided 
electronically by Swedfund on request and complemented 
with information from Swedfund’s annual reports for the 
periods 2010 -2014.  
• For Sida’s B4D program, including in particular Challenge 
Funds, Drivers for Change, and Private Public Development 
Partnerships, no consolidated information has been found 
(and probably does not exist). Hence, a first table identifying 
programs was prepared using programs listed as public-private 
partnerships on Sida’s website and in the overview provided in 
Resare (2014). This information was complemented with a 
series of detailed searches on the openaid.se website (both 
data and documentation) to identify program contents, 
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partners, years active, regional focus, value of program 
commitments, and yearly disbursements. The resulting table 
was sent to Sida for review. The table was further 
complemented with data some programs by Sida. However, 
data from the original table were not revised due to lack of 
time and resources at Sida.  
• Where possible, data provided by Sida’s departments or from 
documentation on Sida’s website were used. When not 
available, data on total commitments from openaid.se or as 
reported in Resare (2014) were used. As a last resort, annual 
disbursements identified from openaid.se were added up as an 
estimate of total commitments for a specific time period.   
• In order to estimate data on yearly average flows for Sida’s 
programs (to assess broad trends over time) total 
commitments were divided by number of years the program 
was/will be active, and allocated in equal amounts to each year 
of the program. Thus, a program with a total commitment of 
100 million SEK for 2011-2014, would be allocated 25 million 
SEK for 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. This implies 
that if programs are frontloaded in terms of payments (all or 
most funds disbursed early on in the project period), 
estimated commitments are an underestimate of actual 
disbursements for the first years of the program.  
It is important to point out that openaid.se is an imperfect source of 
information for individual programs, whose classifications and 
denominations seem inconsistent between different sources. There is 
no index and programs have to be identified through the search 
function. In order to identify some programs, it was necessary to use a 
variety of search strategies, including several different versions of 
program names – in English, Swedish, abbreviated or not, by main 
partner, etc. Swedfund data are not available in the system. Numbers 
reported in the data-registry of openaid.se, moreover, are not always 
consistent with those reported in program documents available on the 
same site (also through searches).  
Work is nonetheless underway to improve transparency. For 
example, Swedfund’s new Owner’s Directive (adopted in 2014) 
specifically states that Swedfund’s information should be provided to 
the openaid.se system, and the most recent annual report contains 
relatively detailed information on the investment portfolio.   
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Annex 4. Interviews  
Sida Henrik Riby, Project Leader, Swedish Leadership for 
Sustainable Development 
Sida Ola Pettersson, Section Head, Partnership and 
Innovations   
Swedfund Niclas Düring, Program Director 
Swedfund Pernilla Bard, Member of the Board 
Union to Union (former LO-TCO 
Secretariat of International Trade 
Union Development Cooperation)  
Ann-Katrin Koskinen Dolium  
CSR Centre, Swedish Embassy, 
Beijing 
Maysoun Jabali 
DANIDA Jorn Olesen, Chief Technical Adviser, Technical 
Advisory Services 
DANIDA Lars Christian Oxe, Senior Advisor, Evaluations 
Department 
DANIDA Line Brogger, Special Advisor, CSR and Danida 
Business Partnerships 
DANIDA Camilla Valeur Nygaard, Senior Technical Advisor  
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Anno Galema, Coordinator Public Private 
Partnerships   
Netherlands Enterprise Agency 
(RVO) 
Astrid Broeckhurst,  Programme Coordinator, 
Department of International Development 
Rädda Barnen Mattias Forsberg, Manager, Child Rights and 
Business 
UNICEF Christina Heilborn, Program Director 
UNICEF Lotta Lindén, Partnerships Director 
Tetra-Laval Ulla Holm, Global Director, Food for Development 
Office 
Tetra-Laval Katarina Eriksson, Senior Project and Partnership 
Development Manager, Food for Development Office 
H&M Hanna Hallin, Social Sustainability Coordinator at 
H&M 
Maersk Jens Munch Lund-Nielsen, Head of Emerging Market 
Projects, Lead Enabling Trade , Group Sustainability 
 
